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ABSTRACT

Martin Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) is the first of a series
of seven works centred on his concept of the Event (Ereiginis). It is also considered to
be his second major work after Being and Time. Written in a form often cited as not
fit for publication, it nevertheless exhibits the blueprint for Heidegger’s famous Turn
(Kehre). The emphasis of this historical study lies in recognising the contemporaneous
manifestation of the “Abandonment by beyng” in its destructive capacity. The
nihilistic individual is at the core of this Abandonment, which showcases Heidegger’s
description of the individual during the twentieth century. From here, the overcoming
of nihilism is envisioned through the uncovering of the “Forgottenness of beyng” in
its hiddenness in the Abandonment by beyng. So, the starting point of this thesis and
its explication of the Event is in the Forgottenness of beyng and its historical
foundation in the “first beginning”. The Event as such is a call for the thinking of
beyng, an assessment of the thinking out of an “other beginning”. Taking this into
account, the first and second chapter serve as a foundation for the core of the thesis;
first by exploring Heidegger’s controversial Turn (Kehre) and second, by providing a
reconstruction of the Contributions.

This thesis will then demonstrate the two-fold consequence of the Forgottenness of
beyng, namely: the Abandonment by beyng and the Question-worthiness of beyng.

A separate chapter will be dedicated to each of the three main concepts; the
Forgottenness, Abandonment and the Question-worthiness. The hidden nature of the
Forgottenness will be the main focus to begin with, which includes its historical
background in the first beginning and complementing its ‘continuance’ in the
5|Page

Abandonment by beyng. An exposition of the Abandonment by beyng where the age
of machination and lived experience coupled with the human being’s ignorance of
Being within this age are ushered in as a result. This will be demonstrated in its final
form in nihilism and its creation of an opening for the Question-worthiness as a
response. Effectively, this is an exploration of the other beginning’s thinking of beyng
and its necessity for overcoming the first beginning and its foundation in the
Forgottenness.

This paper will conclude with a comprehensive analysis of this tripartite exposition;
showing the deficiencies in Heidegger’s study of Plato and the Pre-Socratics coupled
with the lack of attention being placed on Hegel’s similar call for another beginning
in philosophy. Using real world examples, Heidegger’s Abandonment by beyng will
be shown to be his strongest exposition within the Contributions, although the
historical narrative that is portrayed within the text proves problematic. This is most
evident in Heidegger’s reading of Plato, to whom he attributes the distortion of truth
and the beginning of the Forgottenness of beyng. Finally, the uniqueness of the
Question-worthiness will be shown to be crucial for overcoming the Abandonment’s
inherence within the Forgottenness.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
Abyss – The vacuum of undecidability and simultaneously, the space as such.
Appropriation – To allow for, or the occurrence of the Event.
Being - That which determines entities as entities.
Beingness - A particular characterisation of beings or a being.
Beings - Entities as represented within a world.
Beyng – An archaic German definition of Being (Sein), where the ‘I’ is replaced with
the ‘Y’ in beyng (Seyn). Beyng is to differentiate from the Being of the first beginning,
as such, beyng represents thinking of the Event apropos the other beginning. Beyng
will not be capitalised in this thesis to avoid referring to it as a ‘thing’ or an entity.
Clearing – The space for beyng’s essential occurrence.
Concealment/Unconcealment – The necessary hidden and unhidden nature of the
disclosure of beyng.
Dasein – a being’s Being that is an issue for it. This is how one cares for the world as
inhabited and always remaining conscious of such a world. Essentially, it is how and
in what way an individual or collective is.1
Da-sein – “there-being” or the most fundamental question of Being human. Da-sein
as historical, essentially occurs only as belonging to the Event which is based on the
human being, the gods and the history of metaphysics.
Earth – The foundation or background out of which a world arises as a world.
Historicality – the understanding of the historical ideas and events through the
grounding of Da-sein. A signification of inceptual thinking and thereby, as the
grounding of history in opposition to the historicality of Being and Time.
Historiology – That which never reaches the level of history. An accumulation of
‘facts’ and ‘events’ as perceived by the human being.
History – The view of the essential occurrence of beyng through monumental shifts
in modes of thinking. That which is more fundamental than the historiological.
Inception/Inceptually – The firm instituting of a way of Being or beingness of beings
under a certain guideline of thinking.
Originary – The primordial nature (through the other beginning) of that which is
discussed.
Projection – The human being as ‘freed’ from beings and into beyng.
Sheltering – The encapsulation of a particular ‘truth’ or ‘way’ in Being.
Thrown projection – The understanding of having been freed from beings into beyng
and thus, accounting for how this happens inceptually. This is the understanding of
the openness of the projector’s projection as thrown.
Thrown/Throwness – That which propels human beings unto beings.
World – The human being’s experience as dictated by their unique relationship with
Being.
The Event (Ereignis) – the essential occurrence of beyng in its refusal or withholding.
Beyng in its essence must acknowledge the danger of refusal and overcome it. The
Event appropriates beyng through the other beginning and its overcoming of
propositional thinking.2

Thomas Sheenan, “How Not to Translate Heidegger Dasein,” ResearchGate. Accessed July 29, 2020.
https://www.academia.edu/43179070/how_not_to_translate_heidegger_-_2._dasein_, 3-4.
2
Thomas Sheenan, “How Not to Translate Heidegger Eregenis,” ResearchGate, accessed July 29,
2020. https://www.academia.edu/42962593/how_not_to_translate_heidegger_1._ereignis_, 4. Thomas
1
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INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy is his first demonstrative shift in
thinking from Being and Time towards his later works. It is an attempt to portray the
thinking of beyng as the Event, which for Heidegger, became a necessary transition
from the hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein in Being and Time.3 Richard Polt
maintains that during the composition of the Contributions in 1936-1938, Heidegger
only revealed them to a few of his close confidants.4 The Contributions were then only
first published in 1989 Germany, with the first English translation following ten years
later by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly.5 The second English translation subsequently
followed by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (2012), which is the primary
source for this thesis.

There are two key differences between the two translations. The most important being
the use of the word Ereignis. The Emad and Maly translation refers to Ereignis as
“Enowning” whereas the Rojzcewicz and Vallega-Neu use the term “Event.”6 The
second important translation difference is the word Seyn. The Emad and Maly text
uses the word “Be-ing” whereas the Rojzcewicz and Vallega-Neu text prefers
“Beyng.” The differences may point to varied interpretations of the text, the choice of
words, however, seem to be more based on personal preference rather than semantics.
The central theme of the text regardless is consistent in both translations, namely,
Ereignis and its essential occurrence through the six junctures.

The Contributions for Heidegger are demonstrative of the natural progression of his
thought that was portrayed in Being and Time en-route towards thinking beyond
Sheehan’s descriptive account of Ereignis is opposed to the common translation as Event. For
Sheehan, Ereignis is that which brings-forth, allows, a succumbing to one’s thrownness. In other
words, nothing ever occurs, it is not an ‘event’ as such, more of an ‘appropriation’. It will be
important to keep this in mind when encountering the Event within this thesis in order not to cause
any unnecessary confusion.
3
Richard Polt, The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)”,
(NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 1.
4
Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction, (NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 140.
5
Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad
and Kenneth Maly (Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999).
6
The Event is preferred as opposed to En-owning mostly due to the latter’s anthropocentric
connotations. As this thesis will show, the Ereignis occurs more as an appropriated happening
irrespective of human participation. This is also more in line with Sheehan’s conception of allowing for
one’s appropriation.
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systems and methodologies. This results in several themes that are central to the text
and will later become a staple in Heidegger’s thought throughout his life. The
Contributions have often been characterised as one of the more difficult in
Heidegger’s repertoire, presumably in part, due to it not originally being intended for
publication. The lack of a clear chronological structure, with repetitions and
neologisms not always being consistent with the flow of ideas within the text, are often
mentioned. It is, however, important to take into consideration that the work was a
form of meditation, perhaps even a brainstorming exercise on Heidegger’s behalf,
which does result in ideas that will come into fruition in his later works. The
Contributions then can be seen as the groundwork for his progress as a philosopher
and monumental thinker of the twentieth century, a sort of preparatory-transitionary
exercise on Heidegger’s part.

The central focus of this thesis is the Forgottenness of beyng. The Forgottenness
results in, as this thesis will show, the birth of western metaphysics and therefore, the
Contributions is to be a historical recognition of this Forgottenness. The predominant
effort is then seen to be an envisioning of thought that goes beyond the Forgottenness
of beyng and its foundation in western metaphysics, which will consistently be
referred to for the intimation of the other beginning. The main obstruction to
overcoming the tradition of western metaphysics is in the Abandonment by beyng.
This then reveals the strategy of this thesis; a demonstration of the two-fold
consequence of the Forgottenness of Beyng as that which results in its ‘continuance’
in the Abandonment by beyng and its simultaneous allowance for the emancipatory
potential of the Question-worthiness of beyng. Before proceeding into the core of the
thesis, however, the first chapter will delve into the contentious topic of Heidegger’s
Turn (Kehre) in order to place this thesis within contemporary Heidegger scholarship.
To do so, the significant polarity within Heideggerian studies concerning the meaning
of his works post Being and Time are be discussed. This will form an important
background for the reader’s understanding of the aforementioned Turn. The second
chapter will subsequently reconstruct the Contributions with an emphasis on the six
junctures and their portrayal of the Question-worthiness of beyng. This is essential in
familiarising the reader with the key terms and concepts that are expounded upon as
the thesis progresses. Chapter three through to five will subsequently focus on the
three main themes that represent the thesis’s core respectively, namely, the
9|Page

Forgottenness of beyng, the Abandonment by beyng and finally the Questionworthiness of beyng.

Beginning with the third chapter, priority will be placed on the hidden nature of the
Forgottenness which reinforces its historical progression into the Abandonment by
beyng. It is important to grasp this historical progression to reveal the emergence of
the Abandonment. This will set the stage for the Forgottenness’ dichotomous
exhibition in the Abandonment by beyng and Question-worthiness of beyng as the
foundation for the history of metaphysics. The first consequence of the Forgottenness
in the emergence of the Abandonment will become the focal point of the fourth
chapter. Here, the full spectrum of the Abandonment will be observed, as well as its
inevitable emergence out of its foundation in the Forgottenness. Machination and lived
experience as well as other key themes are to be explored as part of this emergence.
This cumulative effect will be shown to have a final manifestation directly in the
characterisation of the human being as nihilistic. The Abandonment will then initiate
the Resonating of beyng, which creates the potential for the Question-worthiness of
beyng, the subject matter of chapter five. The Question-worthiness of beyng is a way
of imagining the thinking of the other beginning, whilst also representing the
emancipatory solution to the Abandonment. Furthermore, this emancipation involves
a comprehensive historical excavation of the history of western philosophy and its
ideas. This will involve chapter five being centred on four core themes; the gods, the
history of metaphysics, the human being and finally the thinking of beyng. These four
concepts will be shown to concurrently inaugurate the emancipatory potential needed
for the thinking and inception of the other beginning.

The sixth and final chapter analyses the main ideas that Heidegger develops within the
Contributions. The strengths and weaknesses will be explored in detail, with a clear
affirmation of the importance of the text within the philosophical tradition of the
twentieth century. This thesis affirms the Contributions’ call for another beginning
based on the Question-worthiness of beyng as a solution to the Abandonment by
beyng. Notwithstanding the discrepancies that are to be observed within this chapter,
the core project will be shown to be pertinent. The ideas of the text are, therefore, an
important addition to contemporary philosophy, whilst also showcasing a unique
alternative to the current worldview.
10 | P a g e

CHAPTER I: CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARSHIP
Heidegger’s View Of The Turn – (die Kehre)
Contemporary scholarship of Heidegger’s oeuvre commonly acknowledges a shift in
his thought that is known as the “Turn.” This marks a reorientation of Heidegger’s
philosophy that first surfaces in the 1930s, post Being and Time, and becomes fully
pronounced in the 1940s. While the Turn itself is most widely accepted as an important
stage in Heidegger’s philosophical trajectory, there is widespread disagreement
amongst scholars on the meaning of the Turn itself. Generally, in affirmation of the
Turn, the concept of Being from Being and Time is transformed in the Contributions.
This transformation is foreshadowed by Heidegger in The Essence of Truth, written
between Being and Time and the Contributions.

This position is held by Daniela Vallega-Neu and Richard Polt and is to be discussed
in the next section. This interpretative trend in the Heideggerian scholarship reads the
Turn with an emphasis on the uniqueness and the new qualities in Heidegger’s thought
after the Turn. The new conception of the Event that emerges in the Contributions, for
instance, marks an entirely new phase in Heidegger’s philosophy. The Event also
comes with “beyng,” which is central to the Contributions and in The Essence of Truth
is first defined as the “holding sway” between Being and beings.7 As will be explored
in this thesis, beyng is inseparable from the Event, which in itself represents a more
“originary” conception of Being. The opposing view led by Thomas Sheehan and
Mark Wrathall among others which will be presented in the third section - refutes a
change in Heidegger’s project per se. Instead, this scholarly interpretation attempts to
demonstrate Heidegger’s thought as exclusive to the field of phenomenology all along,
more specifically – Being pursued “phenomenologically as the meaningfulness of
things.”8 From within this point of view, Heidegger’s pursuit remained consistent with
regard to the meaning of Being, a phenomenological project that was founded on
Being and Time. This came with major terminological changes in order to adjust to
the shift in approach on Heidegger’s part. The opposing camp does acknowledge a

7

Martin Heidegger and David Farrell Krell, Basic Writings (San Francisco: Harper, 1993), 137.
Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015),
189.
8
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change in approach, albeit without Heidegger having to abandon the original intent of
Being and Time. In light of this, starting with Heidegger’s personal views on the Turn,
it is important to explore this division to fully ascertain this thesis’s position within
contemporary Heideggerian scholarship today.
The general context of scholarly disagreement concerning the Turn in Heidegger’s
thought is his 1946 Letter on Humanism in which he coined the phrase ‘die Kehre’ to
describe a change in his philosophy and its inevitable occurrence as a result of the
subjective nature of Being and Time.9 The Turn is Heidegger’s attempt to go beyond
the limitations of metaphysics and the hurdles that it creates in the form of subjectivity,
which this thesis will show, is a result of the Forgottenness of beyng in the
Contributions. The Contributions can then be seen to be the first major work post
Being and Time that demonstrates this new form of thinking in full affirmation of the
Turn. From the point of view of the Contributions, the thinking of Being must be an
appropriation, and as such, the Event must come to be the predominant approach to
overcoming the limitations of metaphysics. According to William J Richardson, this
realisation by Heidegger marked the Turn and subsequently formed a pre and post
Turn Heidegger, a Heidegger I and Heidegger II respectively.10 Coming back to the
Letter on Humanism; Heidegger will state that Being and Time is not to be discarded
in light of the Turn, “but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location
of that dimension out of which Being and Time experienced, that is to say, experienced
from the fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being.”11 It is important to point
out here that “oblivion” is a term that Heidegger uses interchangeably with his
conception of the “forgottenness,” a historical presupposition that will evolve
historically into several issues that are to be explored further in this thesis.12 This is
also a clear allusion to the Contributions and its designation of Being and Time to the
Interplay, that is to say, thinking that serves as a point of reference, a compass for the
overcoming of metaphysics. This also demonstrates the inherent limitations of Being
and Time and its position as a necessary precursor to the Turn that can be seen as
emergent from within the Contributions.
9

Heidegger and Krell, Basic Writings, 231.
William J Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, 4th ed. (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2003), xxvii.
11
Heidegger and Krell, Basic Writings, 231-2.
12
Michael James Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1999), 72.
10
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The Turn of the Contributions will unfold more comprehensively in Heidegger’s Basic
Concepts – a series of lectures delivered during 1941. Here, Heidegger will explore
the truth of Being instead of the existential structures of Dasein customary of his
previous works.13 The truth of Being in Basic Concepts exhibits how the appropriative
Event allows beings to come into their own Being as “essencing.”14 By showing this
essencing – Heidegger is demonstrating the Turn from beings toward their own Being.
However, this is only possible through a historical return to the foundation of this
‘coming into Being’. The Turn within the appropriating Event, must in this historical
return, determine the origin of thinking that Marius Johan Geertsema describes as
“homecoming.”15 This historical thinking or homecoming for Heidegger is
inextricable to the Event as “the happening of a decision about truth,” and in this
decision; “the manner in which the whole of beings is revealed.”16 This marks the first
fundamental feature of the Turn, the historical becoming of Being, which Heidegger
will use the more archaic term beyng to portray throughout the Contributions.
Effectively, this signifies the shift from the fundamental ontology of Being to the
beyng-historical thinking of the Event.

In so doing, Heidegger alters the form of expression into the structure that surfaces in
the Contributions. In other words, the beyng-historical thinking that comes with the
Turn must include another expression that is to overcome the representational thinking
of the first beginning. This ‘poetic’ shift that Heidegger takes up for the Contributions
onward is an attempt at the language of the appropriative Event which cannot be
expressed through metaphysics and the rationale of the human being. Rather, it must
be expressed through Being and its projection as a “self-saying” that is representative
of the history of a people.17 This is also the reason why Heidegger confronted
Anaximander in Basic Concepts – another method to uncover the first beginning of
western metaphysics and synonymously, inaugurate the other beginning.18 Moreover,
13

Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts, trans. Gary E Aylesworth, (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1993), xi.
14
Marius Johan Geertsema, Heidegger's Poetic Projection of Being (Cham, Switzerland: Springer
International Publishing, 2018), 78.
15
Geertsema, Heidegger's Poetic Projection of Being, 5.
16
Heidegger, Basic Concepts, 17.
17
Geertsema, Heidegger's Poetic Projection of Being, 5.
18
Heidegger, Basic Concepts, xi. For Heidegger, the first inception of western thinking began with
Anaximander. Effectively, the historical repetition must involve a confrontation with Anaximander’s
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the coming to be of beings from within the historical context has to be appropriated
for overcoming the traditional uses of language as a tool. This then marks the second
intrinsic feature of the Turn – the change from the language of the first beginning to
the poetic expression of the other beginning via the appropriative Event.
So the Turn from Heidegger’s perspective is less a change in terminology and method,
rather, more a paradigmatic move to the philosophy of the appropriative Event. This
as shown, necessitates two fundamental features: the beyng-historical thinking and the
poetic expression of the other beginning. This is also evident in comparing the analytic
structure of Being and Time to the lack of structure and flow of the Contributions,
coupled with its very difficult and often cryptic expression. The Contributions,
therefore, is Heidegger’s first explication of the Turn qua the Event.

Affirming The Turn

Richard Polt determines the Event as intrinsic to the Turn that is beyond a minor
terminological adjustment on Heidegger’s part. This is a project that differs from the
phenomenological structures of Being and Time, as Polt explains that “instead of
describing the temporal structures that allow us to understand being, as he intended to
do in Being and Time, he now looks to the happening in which we come into our own
as those who stand in the truth of being.”19 In abandoning the temporal structures of
Being and Time – Heidegger now dives into the history of beyng where Dasein now
becomes historicised.20 This is important to consider that even though there is a
motivation on Heidegger’s part to overcome the subjectivity of Being and Time,
Dasein does continue to play a central role from the Contributions onwards, however,
Dasein now becomes the Da-sein of Contributions. In other words, the selfhood and
collective selfhood get a renewed focus post the Turn, a result of his attempt to think
historically and move beyond the subjective nature of the history of metaphysics.21 For
Polt, this marked change in Heidegger’s thinking motivates his involvement in the
“saying,” which in Basic Concepts, Heidegger attempts to do by going beyond the literal translation of
the fragment.
19
Richard F. H Polt, Time And Trauma: Thinking Through Heidegger In The Thirties (London:
Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2019), 2. This is synonymous to Heidegger’s explication of
the truth of Being in Basic Concepts that was discussed in the previous section.
20
Polt, Time And Trauma, 2.
21
Polt, Time And Trauma, 9.
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political climate of Germany during the 1930s. As Polt will show in his study of
Heidegger during the 1930s, Heidegger was compelled to the Turn by late 1929 as is
evidenced through a cluster of lectures all centred around a political-philosophical
worldview that is bound to his metanarrative of western history as the history of
beyng.22 Beyng, therefore, marks the shift to the historical in the Turn.
Concerning the poetic expression of Contributions, Polt explains is a result of beyng’s
“simplicity.”23 This is also Heidegger’s attempt to overcome subjectivity and
simultaneously, the transcendental thinking of Being and Time.24 In other words, the
Contributions are an attempt to think beyng without having to rely on beings (avoiding
complexity), which leads Heidegger to his new poetic style as part of the Turn and
hence, Polt’s characterisation of simplicity. Simplicity, therefore, represents the
inaccessibility of the Event to direct thinking, a call for the propositionless thinking
that is first proposed in the Contributions.25 For Heidegger to pronounce the
importance of this trend of thought, the Contributions will have to show the inherent
limitations of metaphysics and its historical narrative. These limitations are described
within the Contributions as “words failing us” and in this failure; there is “the event
as intimation and incursion of beyng.”26 The failure of propositional thinking must be
overcome through the naming of beyng, as it is only by recognising the inherent
limitations in language will the poetic expression produce the inceptual condition.27
The poetic shift does not merely reflect a shift in language, as the end goal of the
Contributions unlike Being and Time is not directly proposed, it is not based on a
systematic approach that aims to achieve a temporal structure of Being. On the
contrary, the Contributions can be seen as an attempt to imagine philosophy anew, a
return to the beginning of western history and in so doing; go beyond itself.28 Hence,

22

Polt, Time And Trauma, 2.
Polt, The Emergency of Being, 17.
24
Polt, The Emergency of Being, 160.
25
In the Contributions, Heidegger asserts that simplicity reflects the utter simplistic nature of beyng as
the “between” in the strife of the gods and humans. Importantly, the Contributions show this to be the
first time that Heidegger will attempt to ‘speak out of’ beyng. Later in the thesis, simplicity will be
shown to be one of the eight ways that determine speaking out of beyng as the essential occurrence of
the Event.
26
Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela
Vallega-Neu (Indiana University Press, 2012), 30.
27
Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 30.
28
Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 31.
23
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Heidegger’s declaration of philosophy as sovereign but useless knowledge. 29
Furthermore, where Being and Time can be seen as a historical work that is inclusive
of the history of metaphysics - the Contributions’ new conception of history does not
ground philosophy immediately. As such, the philosophy of the Contributions as
representative of the Turn is always groundless in its ground, and is always a beginning
which, therefore, can “be suspended for a long time and can apparently disappear.”30

It can be shown then that the Turn is unique to the Contributions, a conclusion that is
also reached by Daniela Vallega-Neu: “the notion of the turning is central for
Heidegger and I believe that the reason we find this notion in Contributions but not in
the subsequent two volumes is due to the way Heidegger introduces the event in
departure from Being and Time.”31 Importantly, however, Vallega-Neu cites a letter
from Heidegger addressed to Richardson in which he points out that the Turn is not
merely a change in viewpoint on his part, rather, more a situating of the Turn
concerning the occurrence of the truth of Being.32 So in effect, Heidegger’s Turn aims
to reorient the project that begun with Being and Time and as such has become
intertwined with the Event and the truth of beyng. For Vallega-Neu, the thinking of
Being and Time transforms into the relation between Being and thinking - the word
“of” beyng in the Contributions; the essential occurrence of the Event.33 As mentioned
earlier, this was foreshadowed in On the Essence of Truth, where Heidegger raises the
issue that to remain within the realm of representational thinking results in beyng’s
withdrawal.34 This for Vallega-Neu shows that Heidegger was already thinking
differently to the temporal structures of Being and Time well before the Contributions.
This will ultimately lead to the Contributions and its move “from the transcendental
approach to beyng (in the project of Being and Time) to the thinking of beyng in its
historicality.”35 So, even though Being and Time poses the question of Being more
originarily than ever before, it remains bound to the history of metaphysics.
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Vallega-Neu and Polt do share the view that the focal point for Heidegger shifts
towards the truth of Being. However, while the poetic shift signifies an approach to
speak out of the Event, Vallega-Neu will assert further that the poetic shift is also in
line with the notion of artistic creation as historical inception. This is not limited to
poetizing, but other forms of art such as painting, sculpting etc. In the creation of art,
truth is led to Being and therefore, prepares the ground for the other beginning through
another historical epoch and thinking.36 Geertsema similarly shows that in “its
appropriation, Being projects, founds and heralds itself anticipatorily through poetry”
which Geertsema labels “onto-poetology.”37 So the poetic shift in the Turn also aims
to project a new historical inception, an attempt on Heidegger’s part to shift not just
his thinking and philosophy, but to initiate a paradigmatic shift in history and
philosophy. Furthermore, Vallega-Neu explains that this creation of truth is not the
sole responsibility of a human agent, rather, it is a prerequisite for the Event to occur
as part of the human being’s response to the call of beyng. This again is not limited to
a singular individual such as Heidegger himself, but collective peoples rising to the
inauguration of the other beginning.38 This new trend in Heidegger’s thinking is unique
to the Turn, such that the call for another beginning in history is something that
transcends the phenomenological structure of his previous works. The Turn, therefore,
is to be seen as an incipient project, an attempt at a paradigmatic shift not just in
Heidegger’s thinking alone, but an epochal shift that comes with the other beginning.
Against Heidegger’s Turn
The notion that Heidegger’s work shifts from the question of Being to the Event as
appropriation is central to the Turn, however, for Thomas Sheehan, they are the same
thing.39 Sheehan argues that from Being and Time onwards, Heidegger is guided by
the “thing itself,” which requires a new interpretation of the Turn.40 Essentially,
Ereignis translated as the “Event” for Sheehan is problematic due to two
misconceptions, namely in to “appear” and to “appropriate.”41 In the case of to appear;
36
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what is to appear has already appeared, for it always already has. Appearing can only
be viewed non-temporally – a coming to be that is inherent to the thrownness of
Dasein. As for to appropriate, it is less about an “owning,” more an allowing for a
thing to come into its “own proper state.”42 The Event cannot be viewed as a temporal
occurrence where it happens at certain moments, it is “that which is always already
done (fac-tum) and thus always already operative.”43 Therefore, Heidegger’s project
always remained phenomenological and with the predominant focus on the meaning
of things apropos the human being. To appear and appropriate are consistent within
Heidegger’s works post Being and Time, regardless of a methodological shift in his
expression. The poetic expression of the Contributions, therefore, is Heidegger’s
attempt to explore the a priori human being, without ever leaving the
phenomenological tradition. At its core, Heidegger’s phenomenology remains in
pursuit of the origin of meaningfulness – the implicit drive for the groundless ground
that makes sense of everything that the human being will encounter.44 Sheehan’s
concern regarding the popular misconceptions of Heidegger’s Turn is also based on
the term Event (Ereignis). The commonly accepted translation as the “Event” is
fallacious as again, nothing ever happens, rather, it would be more accurate to see it
as a commingling of “to eye something” and “to own it.” 45 This is relevant for
understanding Sheehan’s perspective on the Turn as this shows that the Event is more
in line with a phenomenological description as opposed to quasi-poetic verbiage. To
“see” and to “own” are processes used to understand that which appears within the
context of meaning. So, Ereignis as appropriation means that the “human being, in its
essence, has always already been brought into its “own” as the open space for
meaningfulness.”46 Having been brought into this space of meaning, the human being
sustains this space in its being-in-the-world. Hence why, for Sheehan, the experience
of the world is a wondrous one and as such, for Heidegger, it remains
phenomenological in the “personal claims it makes on you.”47 Therefore, the
Contributions must be read as a phenomenological pursuit of the meaning of Being
based on the a priori human being.
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It is important to note that Sheehan does acknowledge the Turn as a term that
Heidegger coins, it did not, however, denote a change in the approach of his thinking
and philosophy. Furthermore, Heidegger’s exclamation that the Turn is a mere
reorientation in his thinking is what Sheehan will point to for further evidence to
reinforce his argument. Sheehan will also draw our attention to Heidegger’s ostensibly
perplexing choice of the term “Turn,” and due to its ambiguity within contemporary
Heidegger scholarship – he will prefer “oscillation” as a more appropriate fit.48 A
repeated swaying within a coterminous happening happens to be more demonstrative
of an oscillation as opposed to a Turn. Again, this is taking into account that Sheehan
believes that the Event is the same as the Turn. Following Sheehan, Philip Tonner will
elaborate further that “it is the reciprocity between ‘needing’ and ‘belonging’ that
constitutes Ereignis, and Kehre names this reciprocity qua movement back and forth
between the two terms ‘needing’ and ‘belonging’.”49 The change of thinking is based
on Heidegger’s change in method, a bringing of the inner movement of the Event to
language whilst remaining within the same fundamental question of Being and Time.50
Inevitably for Sheehan and Tonner then, the question of Being is preliminary to the
Event.51 The Event, therefore, is the opening which the historical human being
meaningfully inhabits, which makes it imperative for beings to be understood as they
appear and what they are.52 This leaves the human being to allow itself to be ‘taken
up’ by the Event and in so doing, embrace a quest of meaning. This is the fundamental
phenomenological undertone that Sheehan and Tonner postulate as pervading
Heidegger’s works from Being and Time and onwards.

Mark Wrathall holds a similar view in regards to the Turn, although reaching a
different conclusion. For Wrathall, Heidegger’s works from 1925 to 1945 were all
centred on the essence of truth.53 Truth as unconcealment is reflective in all of
Heidegger’s works and Wrathall is adamant that Heidegger never stops investigating
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this throughout his entire corpus.54 Even though the poetic style that Heidegger adopts
in the Contributions can be seen as a new phase of his thought, unconcealment
nevertheless, persists as one of the dominant themes. To be sure, unconcealment is a
topic that Heidegger will pursue in detail in other works post Being and Time such as
his The Essence of Truth published in 1930-1931. So for Wrathall, Heidegger’s Turn
is really a shift to language, and similar to Sheehan’s position; was “dependent on and
derivative of the meanings we encounter as we inhabit an intelligible world.”55 The
Turn is to be seen as a ‘terminological’ shift, and can only be understood as “language”
replacing “discourse” within the context of truth as unconcealment. This is one way
of explaining Heidegger’s difficult expression within the Contributions.

For Wrathall therefore, the excessive emphasis that has been placed on the Turn and
its supposed indication of a new train of thought is simply misguided: “despite the
appearance of a change from Heidegger’s earlier to his later work on the role of
language, Heidegger’s view remains remarkably consistent in its broad outlines.”56
The terminological shift for Wrathall is based on Heidegger’s recognition of the
metaphysical tradition’s incapacity for experiencing truth as unconcealment.57 In other
words, the essence of unconcealment (alêtheia) is reflective of the shift in language
and expression on Heidegger’s part, which also doubles as the shift from propositional
truth to truth as unconcealment. Whereas the propositional truth is bound to the
processes of traditional metaphysics, unconcealment is only experienced through the
human being’s involvement with the world.58 This demonstrates the necessity for
Heidegger’s quasi-poetic expression, for to speak about truth necessitates living
through the unconcealment as the human being is coterminous with this unconcealing
as it occurs essentially. So, Being and Time serves as an important stepping stone to
the later Heidegger without it being abandoned, for it is only in recognising the
limitations of metaphysics does Heidegger reach this conclusion. In other words, for
Wrathall, a Turn is less a shift in thought, more an advancement on ideas already
formulated within Being and Time.
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Richardson who was one of the earlier scholars to engage in a comprehensive study
of Heidegger remained ambivalent, however, he did see benefits in naming a Turn as
such. For Richardson, there is enough evidence to suggest that significant change has
occurred in Heidegger’s works as part of the Turn, and for practicality, he thought it
useful to characterise it as such:

As for my own proposal—the essentials of which are that there
was a Kehre (by Heidegger's own testimony) and that there
was, therefore, a pre-Kehre (what I took to be Heidegger I—
typified by Being and Time) and a post-Kehre (what I took to
be Heidegger II—typified, say, by Time and Being)—I would
still defend its cogency as a plausible hypothesis for
appreciating the whole of the Heidegger phenomenon taken in
the sum.59
According to Richardson, the Contributions is the significant text that marks the Turn,
and consequently, the distinction is a useful one and at the very least, is beneficial for
heuristic purposes.60 This is not to say that Richardson affirms a complete change in
Heidegger’s thought, for all that it is worth, Sheehan and Wrathall may hold a valid
point of view on the problem. After all, Heidegger does state that the Turn is another
attempt at the problem that began with Being and Time through a “reversal,” as
opposed to complete rejection. This reversal remains within the context of the sense
of Being which inevitably had experienced a metamorphosis that “is as much
controlled by an internal unity as it is dictated by an intrinsic necessity.”61 This process
Richardson explains, is a transformation of what it means to think of Being. Evidently
then, Richardson’s depiction is very much in line with the Event as opposed to a
“sense” of Being. When discussing the need for an understanding of the Turn,
Richardson will point to the then unpublished Contributions. Richardson here,
seemingly undecided, explains that there are several key features of the Turn in which
the “analytic of Dasein” is retained even as the “fundamental ontology” is
abandoned.62 The abandoning, however, is through the Event which he describes as
“the turning-relation-in Being itself.”63 So when Richardson depicts the Turn as

59

Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, xxxvi.
Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, xxxvi.
61
Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, 16.
62
Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, xxxvi.
63
Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, xxxvi.
60

21 | P a g e

representing a significant change, he remains nebulous on the specifics, for instance,
on the one hand, the structures of Dasein are maintained, whilst on the other hand, the
Event comes into full frontal view and taking the lead of emphasis.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is a problematic one, as Richardson’s depiction
is at odds with both an affirmation and refutation, for the Event cannot be discussed
from within the structures of Dasein nor the analytic of Dasein. Dasein of Being and
Time becomes the Da-sein of the Contributions, a historical becoming, a ground for
being human that is “sheer moment and history.”64 As such, Richardson’s case unlike
Sheehan and Wrathall’s remains inchoate. The Turn may exhibit certain new
formulations on Heidegger’s part, however, Richardson may be deliberately choosing
to avoid a deeper analysis. Needless to say, the exposition here does provide enough
support to affirm a Turn at the very least as a tool to navigate Heidegger’s expansive
corpus. The Contributions helps provide clarity on the issue, but Richardson
nevertheless leaves a more conclusive take on this issue for others.

The Emergence of The Forgottenness of Beyng From Within The Turn

The two opposing camps represent a rather minor disparity, as it is generally accepted
that the Turn did actually occur, the question is, however, what did it represent?
Sheehan and others are adamant that it was merely based on language, meaning or
method and the primary goal remained consistent. This, however, downplays the
relevance of Heidegger’s decision to discontinue the project of Being and Time.
Should the Event have been approachable from within the context of Being and Time,
there would be little reason for Heidegger to abandon its structure in its entirety.
Moreover, to read and assert that Being and Time and the Contributions are the same
processes that pursue the same end would prove difficult. Beyond their style and
composition, they reach a different end entirely, with no actual system or process being
envisioned within the Contributions. The Contributions, as opposed to Being and
Time, lack structure and a system as such, for it is Heidegger’s conscious decision to
go beyond the tradition of metaphysics.

64

Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 256.

22 | P a g e

Taking this into account, the thesis affirms the Turn both for practicality as in the case
of Richardson as well as for a monumental shift in Heidegger’s focus and thought.
The Contributions firstly, do not engage in an anthropocentric view of Being as in the
case of Being and Time, which Heidegger characterises as still founded on the history
of metaphysics. The history of metaphysics as constituted in the Contributions is
founded on the Forgottenness of beyng, a consistent eventuation that begins with the
Pre-Socratics and Plato toward its end in Nietzsche. This represents a unique outlook
that had not been pursued by Heidegger in his previous works, a shift from the thinking
of Being to beyng-historical thinking. In essence, in the Contributions, the
Forgottenness is a recognition of a deeply instituted overlooking of the question of
beyng, such that it pervades the work’s entire structure which results in the entire
historical process requiring a ‘repetition’ from the Ancient Greeks to their inheritors.
Secondly, the Contributions much in contrast with Being and Time is Heidegger’s
attempt to overcome the propositional thinking that has come to dominate western
philosophy, as this thinking is what perpetuates the Forgottenness. Furthermore, the
consistent reliance on this framework of thought evolves historically into the
Abandonment by beyng. Here, all of the symptoms that surface from within the
Abandonment in the Contributions are based on this historical ‘forgetting’. In perhaps
what is the most central point in support of the Turn per se, is Heidegger’s assertion
that this will include Being and Time, as it also relies on the same historical foundation
with its ‘systems’ approach. So, should Heidegger have remained within the
framework of Being and Time, the Turn would not have happened, and therefore, the
Forgottenness would not be recognised. Be that as it may, Heidegger does delegate
Being and Time to the Interplay, of which more on in the next chapter, it nevertheless
is hindered by the Forgottenness as is all of western philosophy. So in other words, it
would prove problematic to profess the Turn as a misconception that is merely a
terminological shift in language and meaning as in the case of Sheehan and Wrathall.

In the Contributions there is also the inception of the new term beyng that Heidegger
will exclaim is due to the “originary turning in the event” and is that which brings Dasein to itself.65 So the Being of Being and Time failed to serve as the liberation from
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the history of western metaphysics as originally intended – as it relies on being a
system: “since the end of metaphysics, has to happen ever more decisively, namely,
the fact that the thinking of beyng must not become a “doctrine” or “system.”66 Being
and Time is vulnerable to being read anthropologically instead of being the reverse;
being read in light of the essential occurrence of beyng. 67 The question of Being in
Being and Time as such must include a more originary questioning that does not
remain constricted to western metaphysics, but must simultaneously incorporate it
without being hindered by it. Mark Sinclair will state this succinctly: “To fail to see
that Being and Time leads, in a historical retrocession, metaphysics back to its own
presuppositions would be to read the text metaphysically, in what I have termed a
positivistic fashion.”68 So the Turn in Heidegger’s thought incorporates Being and
Time not as a system or doctrine, but the “self-preparing beginning of the essential
occurrence of beyng itself.”69 Furthermore, Sheehan’s characterisation of the Event
and the Turn being the same present too many issues when reading the Contributions.
The Turn as reflective of Heidegger’s shift can be seen to be synonymous with the
Event undoubtedly, but to see them as bound together will negate the emergence of
the historical in the Contributions and thereby, the Forgottenness itself. The Event as
appropriation must be a historical conception of philosophy and expression whilst also
receding in its portrayal of them. Additionally, Vallega-Neu shows that towards the
end of the Contributions, Heidegger is already leaving the thinking of the Event along
with the notion of the Turn behind in favour of the Event’s connection between the
gods and humans.70 This shows that the Event cannot be thought solely out of the Turn
in Heidegger’s thinking, on the contrary, it can be said to be that which perpetually
questions the ground of all thinking and critically, remains free in its appropriation.
The Turn, therefore, signifies the recognition of this monumental shift in Heidegger's
thought without grounding this recognition in its perpetual questioning. This
Question-worthiness of beyng will then be intertwined with this recognition as the
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historical prerequisite and will be the predominant feature of the Turn that is left out
of Heidegger’s previous works. To finalise all of this with further clarity: the Turn
marks a shift based on Heidegger’s realisation of Being and Time as inherently limited
which subsequently, necessitates the emergence of the poetic expression as a
methodological reversal. In so doing, the historical roots of the Forgottenness are
uncovered, and thusly, the essential occurrence of the Event.

It becomes clear from this that the Turn is based on the beyng-historical thinking that
emerges from within the Contributions. The historical precondition for all thought is
a factor that is unique to the Contributions, for all notions of progress and advancement
are inseparable from the historical foundation of western metaphysics. The history of
western metaphysics Heidegger insists, is characterised by the Forgottenness of beyng
which calls for the beyng-historical thinking that is missing from all his previous
works. The Turn marks this shift in emphasis without a need for a change of focus on
particulars such as language or meaning. Scholars such as Sheehan and Wrathall are
not necessarily and entirely fallacious in their approach, although they overlook the
predominant historical motivation behind the Turn. This is sufficient enough to label
Heidegger’s development from Being and Time and onwards as a post Turn
Heidegger; “for thinking no longer possesses the advantages of a "system"; thinking
is historical in the peculiar sense that beyng itself as appropriating event bears all
history and therefore can never be calculated.”71 The lack of ground (whilst actually
presupposing a ground) that has persisted from the Forgottenness is central to the
essential occurrence of the Event which is what the Contributions aim to make evident.
The inauguration of the six junctures is Heidegger’s way of determining the Turn, an
undulating process that overcomes the systematic approach of his previous approach
in Being and Time.
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CHAPTER II: RECONSTRUCTION - CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY

Prospect
Heidegger in the Contributions states that where Being and Time “still has an
appearance that is “anthropological,” “subjectivistic,” “individualistic,” etc.,” the
“opposite of all this is in view there.”72 There is a need for the transformation of the
question of Being, which involves the repudiation of all systems, worldviews or any
anthropological outlook of Being.73 Essentially, this is an attempt to begin philosophy
anew, to go where Being and Time failed to go, namely, a new beginning for western
philosophy. This theme is one that pervades all of Heidegger’s subsequent works, one
that can be traced to the platform of thought developed within this text.
In the Contributions, “beyng” as the Event demonstrates the recognition of the need
for a “Question-worthiness” as opposed to an adherence to a “worldview.”74 Before
moving ahead, it is important to dissect Heidegger’s use of the word beyng. This is
opposed to ‘Being’ and is based on the archaic German word Seyn instead of the
commonly used Sein. Charles E. Scott suggests that Heidegger’s choice of Seyn
emphasises its unthought dimension and origination, a happening of what is, an elusive
concept that cannot be grasped propositionally.75 Essentially, beyng’s etymological
inception marks an important phase in Heidegger’s thought which characterises an
intimation of the Event (Ereignis). This will ultimately give rise to his conceptual
landmark in western philosophy’s thinking and will be explored in detail as the
groundwork of this thesis is laid, but for now, the Event can be viewed as how beyng
essentially occurs.76

Heidegger contends that the Contributions ought not to be seen as another scholarly
contribution to philosophy. Rather, it is an attempt at a transition from metaphysics to
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the thinking of beyng.77 Therefore, “the thoughtful speaking of a philosophy within
the other beginning must be attempted, in the manner of a preliminary exercise.”78 The
Contributions are in effect, a preliminary attempt at this transition, a groundwork for
thinking that does not describe, teach, explain, or promulgate, as that would recede
into the history of metaphysical thought. It is also not an ‘act’ per se, as this would
also prove problematic, for it cannot be approached from an individual or communal
perspective. This preliminary exercise is before all acts or purposes, it is a questioning
of what is most Question-worthy, a “detachment from every “personal” domain.”79
Hence, the necessary imposition of the concept of beyng and its transitionary nature.
The difficulty in this transition lies in the reinvention or “disentanglement” (of which
more on later) of thought, a move from propositional thinking to the “appropriated
over to the appropriating Event.”80 This must include an overcoming of the age of
“systems” and a move toward the elaboration of beings from within truth as the
essential occurrence of beyng. Therefore, thinking must occur through the Event,
through beyng as the essential occurrence of truth. This occurrence, historically
speaking, happens as a transition from the thinking of the “first beginning” (as the
guiding question – what are beings) starting with the Pre-Socratics culminating in
Platonism, to the thinking of the “other beginning” (how does beyng essentially
occur?). For this transition to occur as this thesis will show, it must be grounded in
history or a deeper reinterpretation of metaphysics which finds its end in Nietzsche as
“the last great philosophy.”81 It is important to note that the Contributions places great
emphasis on the historical influence of western philosophy, for philosophy is never to
be viewed as a firmly grounded body of thought, but a ductile process that begins from
western philosophy’s earliest roots in the Pre-Socratics.
The outline of this process occurs through six junctures which serve as a “preliminary
sketch of the temporal-spatial playing field:”
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

the Interplay
the leap
the Grounding
the Future Ones
the last God.82

This process demonstrates the positive emergence of the Question-worthiness of
beyng as the alternative to the Abandonment by beyng. This will be important for the
reader to grasp the two-fold occurrence of the Forgottenness of beyng.

The Resonating

The six junctures begin with the Resonating, which bears the consequence of the
“Abandonment by being through the compelling plight of the Forgottenness of
beyng.”83 The Resonating denotes the call for this transition, it is humanity’s selfinflicted Forgottenness that results in the Resonating. It is important to note, however,
that the Resonating is not a sudden event that occurred as a result of the contemporary
human condition, it is rather the historical signalling that begun with the Forgottenness
of beyng. This signal was broadcasted from within the influential power of Ancient
Greek philosophy as the bedrock of western philosophy. Therefore, the Resonating is
of Beyng that progressively intensifies historically.

An important feature of this Forgottenness is the negative alternative in the
Abandonment by beyng. Here, the alternative in the Resonating is the consequence of
an age “of a complete absence of questioning” which showcases “mediocrity as status
symbol.”84 Mediocrity is based on the current western paradigm of thinking as one of
blind acceptance, complacency, and a lack of deeper meaningful pursuit of Being
through beings. The Contributions will go into further detail, characterising the
features of this predicament that society finds itself in by asserting that everything is
made, can be made and is all dependant on the “will” to do so.85 Nothing remains
sacred or mysterious and all is representable by way of propositional thinking.
Therefore, the contemporary human being is ignorant of being in any crises
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whatsoever, humanity marches forth absolving itself of the need for deeper meditation
on Being since everything important is replicable by way of propositional thinking.
Moreover, the absence of questioning also fails to allow room for meditation, a
facsimile of solitude is demonstrated through “talk,” or society’s milieu of creativity
as exploited in “picture and sound.” Therein lies the plight of the age, a distortion of
being in the world that is promulgated through the very lens that is used to interpret
beings through beingness and beyond.
This in turn becomes the “greatest plight,” which is the plight caused by the lack of a
sense of plight.86 Essentially, ignorance of being within the plight causes the
Resonating out of the “essential occurrence of beyng in the Abandonment by being.”87
The plight is a description of living in a world deprived of meaning or essence. This
further descends into “machination” and “lived experience.” The Resonating,
therefore, as the first stage of the response to “the age of the complete absence of
questioning,” dictates the need for the transition from the “guiding question” of the
first beginning to the “basic question” (the historical question of Being) of the other
beginning. 88

Beyng as such, becomes the essential occurrence of truth, it becomes the Event and
through this, it must also become historical; it “must undergo history in an essential
upheaval, must be able to both know and say the moment of this history.” 89 In effect,
a historical reinterpretation of the ideas of western philosophy becomes the decisive
moment of the Resonating of the truth of beyng. Otherwise, the source of the
Forgottenness will be overlooked as it has historically. Therefore, the Resonating
exposes the limitations of the descriptive, explanatory, or objective-representational
forms of thinking. For this form of thinking only allows for access to beings as based
on calculation and repeatability, whilst what is needed is a more primordial experience
of beings. The assertion here is clear, to respond to the Resonating of beyng, the
Question-worthiness of beyng must become the foci and subsequently, historical.
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The Interplay
The Resonating leads to the “Interplay,” where the transition from the first to the other
beginning is set in motion. This ‘leading on’ is not to be understood as a step by step
process where one juncture is left behind for the other such that it is composed quasilinearly, rather, it is a unificatory process where all junctures are simultaneously
involved. Again, the bridge for the transition is being built on the foundation of a
historical essence. The Interplay’s link to the Resonating of beyng is historical, and
only through this link can the Interplay’s destination be decided. This history is not to
be interpreted as the historiological, or a foundation for a new “system” of thought, it
is a return to the historical foundation of the ideas that have formed the basis of western
philosophy. Here, Plato (and his influential domination of history within the guiding
question - what are beings?) must be indicted as the first to demonstrate the separation
between Being as beingness and thinking as representational.90 Critically, the Interplay
is not a transition to another beginning starting from the critique of this first beginning,
it is rather “itself the essential transformative preparation of the other beginning.”91
This necessarily entails a historical meditation on the ideas of the first beginning, as
only through this process can the questioning form the basis for the thinking of the
other beginning. In other words, the very process of this historical revisiting of the
first beginning necessarily propagates thinking out of the other beginning, and as such,
links the Resonating of beyng to the Interplay.
The other beginning does not start from beings or Being as beings, rather it “leaps”
into the truth of beyng itself, or what it is that allows for beings to appear in the first
place. The historical meditation then is to be taken on the ground of the thinking of
beyng, and as such, overcomes “logic” and metaphysics. Again, the Interplay is the
overcoming of all metaphysics of the first beginning through the historical grasping
of “a foothold in the other beginning.”92 This must make the Question-worthiness of
beyng primary again, of which Being and Time intended to do.93 However, due to the
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anthropocentricity of Being and Time, it serves as an example of the Interplay as a
“self-preparing beginning of the essential occurrence of beyng itself.”94

The limitations of Being and Time are in its inherent capacity for being
mischaracterised as a work of existentialism or phenomenology. This is due to its
structure being more akin to a system of philosophy, much like the prominent
philosophers of the past. Even though the work itself was an attempt at a fundamental
questioning of Being, it nevertheless proceeds from a framework or system of thought
that was built from within the text. Therefore, it is the first attempt and the Interplay
as the bridge from the first beginning toward the ‘shore’ of the yet to be decided
thinking and questioning of the other beginning. There are no further mentions of any
other prominent philosophers or their works as other examples of the Interplay in the
Contributions, which presumably, is due to their neglect of the Question-worthiness
of beyng in which this thesis will explore in more detail later. This is especially
important when taking into consideration the deeper meaning behind the call for a
questioning of beyng, which is difficult to conceptualise due to its ambiguous and
mysterious nature.

The Leap
From the Interplay, the Resonating of beyng transitions through the “Leap” into the
other beginning - a re-examination of the historical treatment of Being. This entails
the “most daring venture in the course of inceptual thinking,” which “leaves behind
everything conventional.”95 As a reminder, this process is unificatory, not to be
mistaken as a linear progression through the Resonating to the Interplay and then the
Leap. The Leap is a leap into the truth of beyng, the abyss of the fissure, a
transcendence of metaphysics whilst being engaged with its history. This historical
imposition is central as mentioned before, as without this historical background there
is no Leap. The Leap is also not an engagement with beings, nor does it expect
anything from them. Heidegger is envisaging a recklessness, a leap into beyng as the
Event that is anything but smooth. This jarring demonstration that is symptomatic of
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the transition from the first to the other beginning means “to step into a wholly other
domain of history.”96 Therefore, the history of the first beginning will linger on, it will
not be overcome in the sense of being left behind or forgotten as an age past, but will
persist and “carry over into the transition and indeed even into the other beginning.”97
Effectively, this is not presenting a complete rejection of the history of western
philosophy as it may seem initially. The first beginning’s history proves just as
important for the philosophy of the other beginning, a component of the transition that
is intrinsic to the whole process, and as such, naturally entangled with beyng as the
Event. The criticisms of Platonic philosophy and its forebearers are essential to the
process.
The historical imposition of the Leap is in its “thrown projection” or the “carrying out
of the projection of the truth of beyng.”98 In thrown projection, the Leap is not a
performative act, rather the Leap is a happening – the appropriation by beyng. The
Leap is co-dependent with history as that which comes through the immediate leap
over the historiological and through beyng. Therefore, the “Resonating and Interplay
are soil and field for the first run-up of inceptual thinking to the leap into the essential
occurrence of beyng.”99 Being and Time is the foundation for the Leap, unless Being
and Time is understood as a form of existentialism, which would inevitably obstruct
the Leap. Furthermore, the “stewardship” is carried out by grounding and sheltering
the truth of beyng in beings themselves.100 Therefore, the final precondition for the
Leap is the stewardship of the human being as the ground of another history. This
demonstrates the two factors that are imperative to the Leap; Being and Time as the
Interplay and the human being’s thrown projection as the ground of history.

As discussed earlier, Being and Time presents the essential questioning, but does not
go far enough, and also relies on too much, in the sense of not seldom being
characterised as a system. The historical human being, on the other hand, is to gather
“into a nearness to beyng” as preparation.101 This, being the stewardship, is distinctive
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of “going-under” or the preparation for the “uniqueness and non-repeatability of
beyng.”102 Therefore, the human being in its thrown projection plays a critical role
within the transition, although not through the representation of being a subject or
individual.103 Beyng is bestowed upon the human being independent of culture,
progress, or regress and utterly opposed to “anthropologism.” The historical human
being is intrinsic to the transition, the human being is history and as such, essential to
the Leap instead of making the Leap. The human being’s stewardship, therefore, points
to a form of retreat, a succumbing to the Event as beyng, and through this, the Leap
will occur.

The Grounding
The human being’s belonging to the Event as portrayed in the Leap is now understood
in its complete essence in Da-sein concomitant with the Grounding. This human being
is developed within Da-sein and the ground of:

1. the seeker of beyng (Event).
2. the preserver of the truth of Being.
3. the steward of the stillness of the passing by of the last god.
Stillness and origin of the word.104
Da-sein here has its most fundamental character as care (Sorge), which draws on the
ideas in Being and Time - such as care beyond the care for others, but care for one’s
own Being. However, as Susan M. Schoenbohm notes, this notion has now changed
radically, where care doesn’t only entail standing amidst beings but also means not
being entangled by them, instead, allowing their determinations to come through
beyng.105 This points to the dichotomous nature of Da-sein and its care, such that it is
subsumed within the Event in beyng as the granting and simultaneous sheltering
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character.106 Also, the original nature of Dasein is now universalised further within the
Contributions; such that the Dasein that comes out of itself and Being which can be
assigned to things, animals, time, humans is to be overcome.107 So, the Da-sein of the
Contributions is so different that there is no link between the two. Instead, the
Grounding as Da-sein and “the ground of the future human being” is simultaneously
the ground of the truth of beyng where the human being is transformed and the animal
rationale of Aristotle and Descartes collapses.108 Furthermore, Da-sein is rooted in
care with the “Da,” as the “there,” or the openness of beings and the originarily
conceived αλήθεια (unconcealment). So, Da-sein in its care is grounded in its creation
of the space for the unconcealment of beings.109 The “sein” points to the “steadfast
enduring” of this Grounding of the “there.”110
This steadfast enduring is the “seeking, preserving and stewardship carried out by that
human being who has self-knowledge as one appropriated to Being and belonging to
the Event.”111 This is an allusion to the Future Ones of which will be observed later.
Essentially, Da-sein is the opening up of the horizon or space for where, here or there
first comes into play. Where in Being and Time Dasein is commonly understood within
the fundamental ontological interpretation rather than the historical, here, Da-sein is
the “site” and the concealing “between” where the truth of beyng occurs.112 Therefore,
as the site, Da-sein is the between of the strife of “Earth and World” and the mode or
process of the human being’s transformation.113 This leads to the subject of truth as
correctness (correspondence theory of truth) being critiqued, such as Plato’s Cave
allegory utilising truth as the ‘look’ that ends in Nietzsche’s truth as the will to
power.114
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Da-sein essentially represents the key difference and shortcomings of the philosophy
of Being and Time. The other beginning cannot be encountered within the systematic
approach of Being and Time and its characterisations of beings, such as their being
present-at-hand etc. This is merely an attempt to portray the world of beings and their
relationship to Dasein from within a foundation that lacks the deeper questioning that
is needed. Instead, the ground of this relationship and its portrayal of such a world
must be brought up into question in the context of Da-sein and the human being. This
also means that Da-sein is not a characteristic of the human being either, as that would
also suffer a recession. Instead, the human being and Da-sein are “essentially related”
in Da-sein’s signification of the ground of all possibilities, whether the stewardship of
beyng is undertaken or not. Also, the only encounter with Da-sein is within this Leap
into the Grounding of the openness that Da-sein provides in such a way that “the
human being to come must stand in order to keep it open.”115 The deliberate
obfuscation of Da-sein presents its most critical nature, for if we are to categorise or
describe Da-sein, the other beginning is not intimated, neither is beyng as the Event.
Therefore, Da-sein’s occurrence only happens within the nature of steadfastness in the
domain of the human being and its fourfold character of strength, decisiveness,
mildness and simplicity in the other beginning.116
The Future Ones
This chapter presents Heidegger’s most Nietzschean influence, the notion of an
envisioned human being (Übermensch) that is to guide humanity towards the future
of the other beginning. In the Grounding chapter of the Contributions, Da-sein was
the focus, with steadfastness as the core attribute of the human being as also belonging
to the process. These attributes are characterised by the Future Ones as those who are
to undergo this Leap into the Grounding of Da-sein in the transition to the other
beginning. In other words, as Vallega-Neu notes, the grounders of Da-sein are the
Future Ones or those who are amidst the absconding and nearing of the Last God
ground Da-sein through words, works, and deeds.117 This response to the call of the
“Last God” is not theological, instead, it is an “attunement” and determination by it.
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There is a clear allusion here to poets, thinkers and artists, with Hölderlin being a
prime example that Heidegger consistently refers to. The Future Ones are also those
who “bear the staff of the truth of beyng,” and resist the confusion and potential
mayhem that is caused by the “calculatively correct findings.”118 In addition, the Future
Ones are martyrs in the era of “downgoing” or those who make the sacrifice by being
steadfast and expose themselves to consistent questioning.119 Moreover, it is only the
Future Ones that are capable of resisting the “extreme wrath of the Abandonment by
being” as they have “no acquaintance with bleak “resignation.””120

The Future ones are those who cannot fall prey to the age of calculation, as they stand
in “sovereign knowledge as genuine knowledge.”121 Those who sacrifice themselves
as always questioning are simultaneously exposing themselves to the invisible ground
and are intrinsically “futural.” This transition to the other beginning can only involve
the Future Ones, a reimagined form of the human being that is shaped by poetry,
philosophy and art. This theme is not seldom present in Heidegger’s future works and
for the Contributions, it is critical to the whole process. To be clear, in the age of
science and technology where beings have been overcome through calculation and the
like, only the Future Ones will present the alternative. They will be those who are
essentially futural and allow for the mystery of Being to become central again. Given
the specific criticism of modernity as characterised by the age of the Abandonment by
beyng, the Future Ones are to make questioning outside the realm of propositional
thinking central again. This questioning is a form of “restraint,” allowing for where
the truth of beyng may be sheltered and grounded. This also mirrors the notion of
“seeking,” an “advancing into the domain in which truth opens itself or withholds
itself.”122 To recap, the Future Ones in their steadfastness are to sacrifice themselves
in the era of downgoing by always questioning. This questioning is restraint and
seeking the truth of beyng, which is sheltered in the characterisation of truth in the
arts, philosophy, and poetry.
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Finally, the notion of the Future Ones is closely tied to the Last God, which will be
the focus of the next section. It is important, however, to point out that the Future Ones
are characterised by their succumbing to the Last God in the sense of allowing for the
truth of beyng to permeate through themselves, which is somewhat synonymous with
the attunement concept in Being and Time. The Last God then, represents a particular
disclosure of a world as a unique feature of individuals and peoples. The Last God that
permeates through the Future Ones is to play out in a strife, which is what initiates the
coming of the other beginning.

Last God

For the Future Ones, the Last God serves as a compelling force in its cathartic
expression of the people. Specifically, the ‘people’ are to receive their history in
finding their own most God which will bring them back amid beings.123 It follows then
that the people of history are to be guided by the sacrifice of the Future Ones, as it is
they who are to allow for the coming of the Last God and therein, usher in the other
beginning. Therefore, a people can only be a people by being amidst beings again and
in the overcoming of the age of the Abandonment by beyng. The Last God, then,
signifies this process of overcoming in which, the essence of the people must be
grounded in history and their belonging to the God. The essence of the God personifies
the strife of earth and world, where the earth is what beings are unconcealed out of
and the world is their necessarily unique unconcealment and simultaneous
concealment; “World and earth, in their strife, will raise love and death to their highest
level and will integrate them into fidelity to the god and into a capacity to endure the
confusion, within a manifold mastery of the truth of beings.”124 This strife will be
played out by the “Future Ones of the Last God” that will expose the uniqueness and
non-repeatability of being.125 As mentioned earlier, this must involve restraint, which
is “the most intimate celebration of the last god” that will allow for the simplicity of
experience with beings.126

123

Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 316.
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 316.
125
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 316.
126
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 317.
124

37 | P a g e

It is important not to attribute the Last God to an event as such, and yet, it requires the
Event for the Grounding to occur. This means that amidst the most extreme
Abandonment by beyng, the truth of Being may surface, an unconcealment that arises
out of the necessary concealment, and thereby the Last God in its seclusion from the
Event, simultaneously requires it. Here, the Event can only be appropriated at
humanity’s crisis point, where the Abandonment has reached its threshold of
significance which results in the “simplest strife,” where earth and world meet at a
new level of maturity.127 This maturity is the consideration made for the negativity of
beyng, namely, the questioning that lies outside the realm of the merely logical and
calculative in an engagement with “nothingness.”128

The final juncture being the Last God, therefore, is not to be interpreted as anything
theological, metaphysical or spiritual. Rather, the gods are that which overwhelm or
assail the human being and are the “extreme venture of the truth of beyng.”129
Therefore, the Last God necessarily occurs through beyng as the Event and as such
occurs as a mode of exposing the human being’s horizon and being in the world. The
“Last” is what is beyond any form of calculation and therefore, “must be able to bear
the burden of the loudest and most repeated misinterpretation.”130 Essentially, human
beings are not in control of the gods, as they occur through the human being and are
meaningful in that they present a world as the world that appears. So, in the act of
disclosing a world, the gods necessarily recede into the background and remain
hidden, such that their intrinsic role as “world-revealers” necessarily includes
concealment. There is no ignoring the eschatological theme in this chapter,
particularly the reference to the most extreme Abandonment which leads to the
simplest strife. However, the pervading theme of this chapter that compliments the
Contributions as a whole is one of restraint and allowing for things to be, to unconceal
themselves without the all-pervasive worldview that is symptomatic of Abandonment.
The Last God signifies such restraint in its remaining absent in the mystery and beyng.
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Beyng as the Event

The six junctures that begin with the Resonating of beyng climaxes in the essential
occurrence of beyng itself through a monumental change in philosophy and thinking
as a whole.131 Philosophy will now create a “hearing” which corresponds with the
Question-worthiness of beyng.132 This paradigmatic shift in thinking and especially
philosophy is to overcome all historiological comparisons in traditional literature and
poetry to grasp the thinking of beyng. There is a consistent reference to Holderlin’s
poetry as the primary source for the “hearing of words,” such that the task is to “ground
the projection of truth of his poetry in the meditation and disposition wherein future
Da-sein oscillates.”133 This hearing represents the ability to speak out of the Questionworthiness and is the prerequisite for the creating of a space for the word. In this way,
it is aiming at a precursory foundation of language, utterance and expression.

In choosing the poetry of Holderlin, Heidegger is demonstrating the thinking of beyng
as per the other beginning. Firstly, the thinking of beyng must never “flee into a form
of beings,” neither can it “pursue dissolution into formlessness.”134 Vallega-Neu will
explain that beyng as such, occurs independently of beings whilst also allowing for
their rising and declining.135 Therefore, the other beginning represents the thinking of
beyng as inseparable from that which is being thought, it is in itself the essence of
truth. Secondly, this truth as appropriated by both the gods and humans involves the
creation of genuine history, and thereby the Grounding of philosophy anew. From
here, beyng that is explicatory in the intertwinement of thinking and Being is to define
philosophy and issue its disentanglement which was formerly bound to science,
culture, worldviews and metaphysics in its beginning.136 This does not mean that there
is to be a complete discord between the aforementioned areas of human endeavour and
philosophy, rather, it is the more original appropriation of the essence of philosophy
which simultaneously arises out of beyng and this disentanglement.
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Philosophy of the other beginning then must proceed from the truth of beyng, which
overcomes all calculation, propositional thinking, and explications between beings
and Being. Metaphysics will not be disregarded, neither will it be opposed in the
historicality of beyng. Instead, the questioning of beyng projects the very ground for
where an overcoming or opposition of metaphysics must adhere; “such projection
brings this questioning altogether outside of that difference between beings and
being.”137 An understanding of the history of metaphysics is imperative to this whole
process, which as covered earlier, is essential to the Interplay. This thinking is outside
the framework of logic or metaphysics, such that the word beyng is chosen for
indicating this form of thinking and in its withdrawal - is traceless in beings.138 The
difficulty presented with this idea – is the thinking that is to “grasp the abyss of the
neededness of beyng,” which is to think of the necessity of the Grounding whilst not
receding into a form of absoluteness.139 Again, this is a thinking that is removed from
all other forms of worldview such as theology or its counterpart in atheism, so in effect,
is not reducible to an absolute, i.e., God. This thinking engages with the historicality
of beyng to necessitate the Grounding as based on what is Question-worthy, namely;
the gods, the human being, the history of metaphysics and the thinking “of” beyng.140

It is important to note that the Contributions attempts to speak out of the Event and
Heidegger, nevertheless, is also wary of the text being mischaracterised as a system
approach much like Being and Time. However, as it has repeatedly been made clear
within this chapter, the age of systems has passed and to speak out of the Event is
impossible from within the presuppositions of metaphysics. As Vallega-Neu explains
clearly: “Heidegger’s attempt at speaking of the Event, at letting his thinking be guided
by a response to how beyng eventuates, is fundamentally exposed and without
fundament in the metaphysical sense.”141 The thinking that is of the Event, is one that
is kindled from within the history of the unique moment where thinking finds itself
emerging in the first place. The emergence is out of the Abandonment and the
Forgottenness of beyng, for it is this plight that ignites the Resonating of beyng.
137
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Richard Polt shows that it is Heidegger’s position that Plato’s idea lures us away from
the “Event of the emergence” in its eternalising how what is given presents itself.142
To conclude by way of a summary of this chapter then; the Resonating of beyng that
refuses the absence of questioning of the first beginning - is the first sign of the call of
beyng, indicating the need for a transition to the other beginning.143This begins with
an engagement with the Forgottenness of beyng in its hidden modes which is the
subject matter of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III: THE FORGOTTENNESS OF BEYNG
The Hidden Mode of the Forgottenness of Beyng
The Contributions’ fundamental criticism of the history of philosophy and
metaphysics is based on the contingency of the Forgottenness of beyng. This
Forgottenness is not something blatantly obvious to even the more prominent thinkers
of times past and as a consequence, has been mostly overlooked. This is due to its
remaining undetected historically which also simultaneously demonstrates its ability
to perpetuate historically. Prima facie, science and technology’s notion of progress
exhibits more accurate calculations and efficient processes. However, in actuality, the
foundation for this scientific and technological progress is avoided, such that this
notion of ‘progress’ in itself is a presupposition due to its lack of questioning and
proper grounding. From this perspective of advancement, technology consistently
produces better health care, more efficient industries, and the like - which ostensibly
enhance the human being’s quality of life whilst also neglecting the deeper questioning
that is needed in enacting a grounded understanding of progress. For, as humanity
marches forth within the dominance of science and calculation, the era of machination
and lived experience are ushered in through “the disenchantment of beings, which
grants power to an enchantment that is carried out precisely by the disenchantment
itself.”144 This can be observed contemporaneously vis-à-vis ecological destruction,
climate change, resource exploitation and international conflicts, etc. It is important to
note, however, that the Forgottenness is an essential feature of the essential occurrence
of beyng and one of the fundamental prerequisites for the Resonating of beyng that is
beyond the human level at this point, which Heidegger describes as:

of the essential occurrence of beyng
out of the Abandonment by being
through the compelling plight
of the Forgottenness of beyng.145
Heidegger here is indicating that the aforementioned negative consequences that are
symptomatic of the Forgottenness are essential to its recognition, and as such, are
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intrinsic to the Resonating of beyng. Through this recognition, the overcoming of the
plight is possible, and thus, its belonging to the Abandonment can be simultaneously
exposed.

Critically, the most devastating aspect of the Forgottenness is its hidden nature, one
that progresses further into the Abandonment by beyng whilst remaining hidden
within its metamorphosis.146 It is out of this ignorance that the “greatest plight” will
emerge out of in the Resonating of the truth of beyng.147 As stated earlier, this can only
begin upon the recognition of the Forgottenness, for the Forgottenness cannot know
itself in its very nature.148 Evidently then, the Forgottenness is dependent on three
fundamental conditions; firstly, it's surfacing out of the first beginning as a plight,
secondly, its hidden nature that doubles as humanity’s ignorance of being within this
plight as the ‘greatest plight’ and lastly, its persistence within the Abandonment by
beyng in a mode of deeper disguise. Ultimately, these hidden modes surface in a wide
array of consequences in the Abandonment by beyng which will be observed in more
detail in the third chapter of this thesis. On a whole, this points to the Forgottenness
and its exclusivity within the realm of beings and their presencing.149
Therefore, for the Resonating to “sound out” and the unfolding of the Abandonment
by beyng (in the hidden mode of the Forgottenness of beyng) to occur, the history of
the first beginning and its alternative potentiality – the Question-worthiness of beyng
must be explored.150 So, the Forgottenness of beyng presents a two-fold potentiality
out of the first beginning; firstly, in its hidden progression within the Abandonment
by beyng and secondly, its simultaneous demonstration of the need for the Questionworthiness of beyng. This points to the essential occurrence of beyng as a necessary
historical return to the first beginning that exposes the primordial cause of the
Forgottenness, which then needs to be understood and grounded anew. Should the
Forgottenness in its hidden mode be uncovered and the age of complete absence of
questioning be overcome, history must be revisited only in light of this Forgottenness.
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As such, the Forgottenness has its foundation in the human being’s historical attempt
at transcending beings, a neglect of the appreciation and practicality of beings as
beings. Carol J. White explains that Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides for
Heidegger recognized this necessity, whilst Plato neglects this background in pursuit
of the unchanging, immutable idea as the being of what-is.151 So, the Forgottenness at
its core denotes an overlooking and transcendence of beings in an effort of neglect
which begun with Platonic philosophy, or more specifically, Plato’s idea as depicted
in the Cave allegory.152 This criticism carries over to the sciences and technology
prominently, which analyse, calculate, and exploit beings with the sheer purpose of
contextualising them into a worldview. The central issue in Heidegger’s account of
history lies in Plato’s positing of the world of Forms as a presupposition. Effectively,
Plato is aiming to reject the world as it is unconcealed with his intellectualising of a
more perfect and harmonious world. As such, truth is in the Platonic sense, always in
relation to an immutable idea. This overlooking of the asking of the question of Being
is what characterises Heidegger’s historical foundation for the world of science and
technology. Because Plato overlooked the question of Being in his philosophy, the
question of Being remains unasked and as such, forgotten. The Forgottenness will then
perpetuate historically from Plato beginning with the Aristotelian refutation of
Platonic metaphysics, whilst remaining constricted to the Forgottenness.153

It is important to consider that Platonic philosophy represents the Forgottenness’
early-stage manifestation in the history of metaphysics, so the overarching influence
would take over two millennia to fully form into the Abandonment by beyng in its
expansive modes. The Forgottenness, therefore, which has its roots in Platonic
philosophy, still contained thinking as “unconcealment,” creativeness that is in awe of
beings, and yet, it still allowed for the degeneration of beings “in which the
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Abandonment by being then unfolded in ever-greater concealment.”154 The idea then
is that even though Plato and Aristotle represent the primary historical culprits of the
Forgottenness in Heidegger’s account, the more specific cause lies in the interpretation
or perhaps even the mischaracterisation of their respective philosophies. Moreover,
the Abandonment only surfaces in its position within the scientific and technological
worldview, the age of machination and lived experience long after Plato and Aristotle.

The Forgottenness of beyng as the cause for the Resonating, therefore, is only possible
within this metamorphic process throughout the history of metaphysics, such that the
Platonic influence can only be envisaged fully in its ripening into the Abandonment
by beyng. It will follow then, that this transformation can only be addressed in its full
capacity in the later stages in machination and lived experience. Effectively, this
represents the Forgottenness’s historical hiddenness, such that its transformation
throughout history only truly surfaces within the overwhelming influence of the age
of science and technology, and only then can the Forgottenness allow for the
Resonating of beyng in its full historical significance. This is of critical importance
with respect to the beginning of the Forgottenness, as its initiation was wholly
dependent on the ambiguity of the Platonic influence. This ambiguity pertains to
whether Plato’s inception of the idea was solely responsible for the Forgottenness or
rather more a victim of distortion by the inheritors of his philosophy. Heidegger
remains vaguely undecided in regard to this, as is noted in his statement on Plato as
“specifically (the interpretation of the cave allegory) as that thinker in whom a last
glimmer of ἀλήθεια becomes still clear in its transition to truth as located in assertions
(also Aristotle, Metaphysics IV).”155
What can be drawn for certain is that in attributing Plato’s philosophy to the beginning
of the Forgottenness, regardless of whether this is entirely a result of Platonic
philosophy or rather a distortion of his work, contributes to an important historical
springboard figuratively speaking. Parallels can be drawn between this issue and
Heidegger’s Being and Time, which he deems as largely misunderstood as a work of
existentialism or phenomenology, which subsequently led him to designate it as the
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Interplay. The historical continuance of the Forgottenness starting with Plato is
marked by its second preeminent position in Nietzsche as the last carrier who “grasps
“being” entirely in the sense of the oldest Platonic tradition.”156 This can be observed
in Nietzsche’s Apollonian-Dionysian dichotomy and its criticism of Greek tragedy
and particularly, Platonism.157 Nietzsche’s rightful criticism here is focused on Plato’s
overemphasis of reason and its neglect of the mysteries of Being through the myths
and arts that were customary of the age. However, this historical process must be
observed in detail to understand how it is that the Forgottenness would transform
throughout the ages as obligatory for the essential occurrence of beyng as the Event.

The Beginning of the Forgottenness of beyng
The Forgottenness of beyng’s main attribute lies in the foundational truth - ἀλήθεια
and its transformation into correctness historically. Even though the two most
important positions in western history for Heidegger are marked by Plato at the
beginning and Nietzsche at the end, the transformation of truth began with the PreSocratics. This can only be grasped by a more developed meditation on history, which
shows that ἀλήθεια guided the Pre-Socratics questioning of ὄν (Being) and yet, still
allowed for the introduction of the ἰδέα (idea).158 To be clear, despite the aphorisms of
Heraclitus and the didactic poem of Parmenides, they “accomplished neither this
instituting or grounding” of their Greek thinking.159 From here, truth as correctness is
introduced through the philosophy of Plato where priority is given to ψυχή (soul) and
inevitably, the subject-object relation. Moreover, truth as correctness is pointing to a
“derivation of beings as possible productions of other beings,” a consistent attempt to
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reproduce, repeat and exploit beings based on their usefulness.160 When things are not
capable of being explained in such a way, they are designated as “not a being.”161

The resulting Presocratic failure to ground the questioning of Being as the foundation
distorts truth into assertion in “one of the strangest occurrences in the history of
truth.”162 This is due to its seemingly ordinary conception historically, for it is widely
accepted as a perfectly natural and rational notion of progress which, for the most part,
makes it extemporaneous. Truth in the scientific and technological world view can
only be truth should it be replicable and representational, otherwise, it is a regression
into the ostensible archaic myths or mysticism customary of the prescientific age.
Therefore, the most difficult task is to “seek and preserve” the truth of the Presocratic
thinking whilst accompanying it by the “veiling of the essence of beyng.” 163 This
veiling of the essence of beyng constitutes the beginning of the Forgottenness and the
necessary historical excavation and subsequent Grounding of it. This is not a complete
disregard of technological and scientific progress to allow for the Question-worthiness
of beyng. Beyond being critical of technology and science, this rather is a more
meaningful interpretation of them that necessarily includes as opposed to excluding
the unitariness of thinking and Being that was characteristic of the Pre-Socratics. It is
only through this appropriation that the Forgottenness can be recognised in its full
essence and therefore, the Abandonment be addressed.

So, it is important to account for the appropriation of the Forgottenness involving the
two most important landmarks of philosophy and metaphysics, which as discussed
earlier, are in Plato and Nietzsche. Beginning with Plato, ἀλήθεια becomes correctness
specifically in “an interpretation of the cave allegory which is complete and rooted in
the question of truth,” as it “occupies such a key position, then we can indirectly
fathom what it means to establish truth as ἀλήθεια for the first time in thought.”164
From here, there are six important considerations:
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1. ἀλήθεια guided Greek thinking whilst simultaneously
allowing for the introduction of the ἰδέα as the collapse of
truth.
2. This collapse was due to the lack of institution and
grounding of Greek thinking.
3. Only in recognising this transformation from ἀλήθεια to
ἰδέα allows for truth as unconcealment to be recovered or
at the very least, maintained.
4. Understanding the Cave allegory’s central position
historically also allows for truth as ἀλήθεια to be unfolded
and grounded in its essence.
5. This Grounding of the essence of truth must include the
clearing for self-concealing of truth itself - a clearing
concealment that must ground itself in Da-sein. This
necessary self-concealing is the essential occurrence of
beyng itself.
6. Finally, only by taking this long and complex historical
interpretation into account can the interpretation of the
Cave allegory be grounded in the essence of truth, and
therefore, in the essential occurrence of beyng as the
Event.165
Nietzsche’s role in this is somewhat ambivalent, especially when contrasted with that
of Plato. Plato’s chief concern was the overcoming of beings by positing the world of
Forms, which inadvertently led to the abolition of the mystery of beings. Nietzsche,
on the other hand, questioned truth passionately, although not in an originary way. 166
Nietzsche’s rejection of Platonic philosophy was the right approach although, he
remained constricted to the very tradition he attempted to transcend. Therefore,
Nietzsche’s intention for questioning truth necessarily omits the fundamental
Question-worthiness of the essence of truth for three reasons:

1. Nietzsche's lack of originary questioning is founded on
questioning that is based on “life” as a biological-idealist
approach.
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2. “Being” for Nietzsche is still tied to the Platonic tradition
in its notion of truth as “what is true.”
3. From here, this notion of truth as oriented toward life and
the Platonic conception of Being is still questioning based
on representation, and therefore, impedes the originary
Question-worthiness of the essence of truth.167
The history of the Forgottenness then, is merely a perpetuation of Platonic truth, never
truly approaching the Question-worthiness of beyng. Immanuel Kant, prominently,
will advance beyond the conception of “biological realism” in the sense of it being
more than an “I,” yet itself being grounded in self-lawgiving and therefore, remaining
within the Platonic tradition.168 The problem here then, is as follows, the rejection of
the “I” by postulating a unity of “spirit-soul-body” or its reversal is still evading a
fundamental questioning.169 In effect, it still makes advances that include unquestioned
presuppositions.170 To prevent this, the questioning of the self or the “I” must stand
outside theory or metaphysics in the general sense. This necessitates a beginning
which grounds itself whilst reaching ahead, in that it “reaches ahead insofar as it
grounds and is therefore unsurpassable.”171 Due to its being unsurpassable, this return
must be repeated consistently and only then can the uniqueness of its inception be
original, and in this way, be another beginning.172 This represents a malleable state of
history and ideas, such that nothing is solidified in the sense of having a consistent
foundation. The groundless nature of the historical-grounding itself is what founds the
other beginning in its consistent historical repetition. Kant’s important position within
the first beginning does however, show a more enhanced conception of metaphysics,
which will also be observed in detail in the next section.
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By way of recap then, the return to the history of the Forgottenness in Plato must
repeatedly begin anew, for only from here is the deeper questioning possible through
the essential occurrence of beyng as the Event. It is crucial to present beyng’s
centrality within the transition from the first beginning to the other beginning for the
Grounding of Da-sein in the advent of the Last God. This transition through the six
junctures is preceded by the Forgottenness, which necessarily includes the recognition
of the influential power of Plato leading up to Nietzsche. For it is here that the most
important issue in philosophy has been neglected and misrepresented through
epistemology and ontology and ultimately, metaphysics.173 By overlooking the
questioning of Being in the Forgottenness and thereby ushering in an era of lived
experience and machination, thought itself descends into a worldview that suffers from
further degeneration as a “scholastic quibbling of churches” or “the indifferent pursuit
of philosophy as erudition.”174 As a result, the questioning that is needed through
meditation and self-contemplation in itself becomes incongruous, which also
demonstrates the lack of true goal setting and meditation on Being. This is also the
lead up to the need for the Future Ones as martyrs in their perpetual questioning of the
first beginning.

The First Beginning
The historical inception of the Pre-Socratics leading up to Plato signifies Heidegger’s
first beginning and is based on the guiding question. This guiding question (“What are
beings?”) is the most important issue in philosophy and has been misinterpreted
through various fields of philosophy.175 The basis of this questioning is what should
be the scaffold of philosophy and yet, it has mostly been forgotten. The
misinterpretations that the guiding question has endured as a result are symptomatic
of philosophy’s position in society as a “cultural asset” or “cultivation” tool. 176 This
then results in a particular worldview that seeks to be above philosophy, especially in
Nietzsche, who will attempt to disavow philosophy as a form of erudition. This
effectively depicts Nietzsche’s subscription to a particular worldview, that of a poet-
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philosopher.177 However, this is an inherent form of self-contradiction, in that
Nietzsche’s rejection of philosophy as an erudition is a subscription to an alternative
worldview. This would inevitably prove ill-equipped to expose machination qua lived
experience, as will be shown in greater detail below. The main issue here is as follows:
philosophy and worldview – a particular philosophical outlook or system, are entirely
incommensurable, as philosophy always reverts to that which it grounds and
subsequently, forms the basis of its questioning from there. Philosophy as such must
be “groundless in its ground” to maintain a sovereign openness that is free from any
obstructions to its thinking. So, if philosophy is grounded in Nietzsche’s worldview
as the “poet-philosopher’s,” it would then result in its being constricted to this very
ground, of which machination at its early stages is free to manifest. From here
philosophy is condemned to being merely a tool of wisdom or cultivation as another
worldview in society as based on Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic insights, regardless of its
rejection of Platonism.178 Therefore, Nietzsche, who recognises the detrimental effect
of Platonism as nihilism in disguise, still eschews the Question-worthiness of beyng
in his grounding of philosophy in a worldview. This can be illustrated in Christianity’s
opposition to Nietzsche’s worldview; the obsolete “domination” of the churches and
their worldviews that substitute the spirit for the ἰδέα in guiding public opinion.
Effectively, the lack of questioning persists within Christianity, although applied
differently.
This predicament does not demonstrate philosophy’s end or its final position within
society. On the contrary, the first beginning’s current paradigm is what enables its true
essence to surface through its encounter with the other beginning. Philosophy must
find itself in its essence by questioning the truth of beyng as its “grounding centre,”
which designates the groundless abyss of philosophy. Philosophy is groundless in its
very nature, and any subscription to a particular worldview is entirely opposed to this
nature which is to “bring into the free domain of its meditation the fissure and the
“beyond itself,” the strange and the perpetually unusual.”179 So, the first beginning
does not impede philosophy in the general sense despite its historical infusion initially.
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The first beginning and its overlooking of the question of Being in the guiding question
is preparatory in its confrontation with the other beginning and jump-starts the
subsequent revival of philosophy’s true essence. This also means that the philosophies
of the Pre-Socratics and Plato all leading up to Nietzsche are not to be viewed as an
obsolete thought process, rather, they represent the Resonating of beyng, a call for the
Question-worthiness of beyng. In other words, the thinking of Plato and Aristotle
which are still bound to the first beginning is still responsible for the domain of
thinking as representation and play a critical role in this transitionary process.180 This
also includes the later transformations of Platonic philosophy, such as in the case of
the transcendental idealism of Kant and his path to the ground as space and time which
is still obstructed by his preconception of the “I” and “consciousness” as the
preconditions for Being, a questioning that begins at consciousness.

So, to provide further clarity, the constitution of the first beginning is structured by
five main episodes which are critical for a concise determination of the Forgottenness
and subsequently allowing for the essential occurrence of beyng as the Event:

1. The first beginning showcases the true essence of
philosophy as that which is beyond and more fundamental
than a worldview. They are necessarily incommensurable,
and therefore, demonstrate the abyssal nature of
philosophy. Philosophy here must be recognised in its full
capacity as the groundless historical meditation that
grounds the Question-worthiness of beyng.
2. The first beginning was initiated by the Pre-Socratics
especially Anaximander and encompasses the entire
history of the guiding question leading up to Nietzsche.181
This must place specific emphasis on the importance of
Plato’s role within the distortion of truth, specifically with
the introduction of the Cave allegory and its conception of
the ἰδέα.
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3. The first beginning that signifies the historical overlooking
of beyng that transforms into machination and lived
experience in its most current form is an intrinsic
component of beyng as the Event. Only by being within
the plight and recognising it as the greatest plight (in the
Abandonment by beyng) is the first beginning going to be
meaningfully engaged with the other beginning. Also, in
the first beginning’s positing of the truth of beings without
asking about truth as such, makes space for the other
beginning. The other beginning as such will then represent
the truth of beyng in the ground of the essential occurrence
of beyng as the Event.
4. It follows from this that the deeper repetition of history is
imperative, as is clearly shown within the first beginning,
such that its essential character and essence are to be
placed historically. Necessarily, the basis of the first
beginning in the guiding question must be understood and
anchored, which will then allow for the repetition of
history’s reinterpretation by engaging with this anchorage.
A sense of direction and planning in this recognition must
be implicated for the transitionary process to occur.
5. Most fundamentally, the first beginning in its essence as
the guiding question exposes the Forgottenness of beyng.
From this, the two-fold character of the Forgottenness is
visible; firstly, in its proverbial metamorphosis into the
Abandonment including its multitudinous modes and
secondly, in the opening for the Question-worthiness of
beyng. This also means that the first beginning is also
inherent in the Resonating of beyng, only in its later
historical stages in Nietzsche however, where the age of
machination and lived experience are in full effect.
The transitionary process is critical, not inevitable. These are the mere precursory
conditions for the transition, although, “the transitional is the genuine battle.”182 The
main reason for this is due to the positing of the guiding question as to the primordial
fundament of the first beginning. However, to characterise the entirety of the history
of the first beginning in the guiding question exclusively is also a gross
oversimplification, as it merely serves “the sake of a rough, first instruction.” 183
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Therefore, it is obligatory in the deeper meditation of the history of philosophy to
develop the guiding question which up to Nietzsche has been largely ignored, for only
then can “the inner movement of this thinking can be seized.”184 There is an added
benefit to drawing on the unique interpretation of the Pre-Socratics in asserting that
the question of the beingness of beings is all grasped unitarily in thinking. In doing
this, the final hurdle involves the grounding of thinking, such that the animal rationale
that evolved out of Plato’s philosophy is to be overcome by a unique reinvigoration of
the unitary composition of thinking and Being by taking the Pre-Socratics into
account. This involves the necessary excavation of the complex historical evolution
of the first beginning up to Kant as based on thinking as certainty and objectivity as
beingness.185 This historical process is based on these necessary steps:

1. The origin of modern thought up to Kant.
2. Understanding this as the foundation for Kant’s
originality.
3. How the Christian tradition co-dependent with its
abandoning of Kant led to the absolute thinking of German
Idealism.
4. The evident incongruence of metaphysical thought with
technology, industrialization and liberalism of the
nineteenth century which inevitably, led to positivism.
5. How a semblance of Plato and Kant is maintained and an
attempt at its reappropriation is repeatedly made.
6. The final cumulative effect of all these steps in Nietzsche’s
building on Schopenhauer’s ideas in an attempt to reject
Platonism whilst remaining constricted to it.186
This further demonstrates that only through understanding this long and complex
history of the first beginning that a confrontation with the other beginning can occur.
Again, this is not a counter-movement, as that would mean being codetermined by that

184

Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 141.
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 142.
186
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 142-3.
185

54 | P a g e

which it is counter to.187 So, the only ‘attachment’ that the other beginning is to have
to the first beginning is based on the recognition of its complex historical position and
the guiding question. This also means that the future in the other beginning will not be
made from within or grounded in the first beginning, rather, it will be grounded in the
“opening up of the truth of beyng in the uniqueness of beyng.”188 This is an opening
that allows for that which is beyond mere opposition and refutation of metaphysics.189

The other beginning henceforth can only be intimated rather than grasped. Given the
very little we can say of the other beginning, the most we can intuit about it is based
on its confrontation with the first beginning. Effectively, the other beginning cements
the genuine originality of the first beginning in the truth of its history and its
authenticity in active engagement with its thinkers, as has been explored thus far.190
An attempt at envisaging the other beginning will be made in greater detail later on in
conjunction with the essential occurrence of beyng. Before this, the two-fold
consequence of the Forgottenness of beyng will be demonstrated.

The Two-Fold Consequence of the Forgottenness
Having established the first beginning’s role in playing into the Forgottenness, the two
resulting potentialities will now become the focus. Firstly, it’s important to
acknowledge that the Forgottenness acts as “the compelling plight” that is
codependent with the Abandonment by beyng.191 In this sense, the Abandonment is
intrinsic to the Forgottenness and as a result, will persist unperturbed unless
recognised as such. As observed earlier, the recognition of this plight is what brings
forth the Resonating of beyng and simultaneously, the potential for a transitionary
process through the six junctures in the essential occurrence of beyng as the Event.
Given the historical evolution of the Forgottenness and its predisposition to the
guiding question, the Abandonment by beyng is what signifies the Resonating in the
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first place. Therefore, should the “highest plight” or the ignorance of the plight as a
plight continue unabated, the Resonating will remain unheeded. What stands in
opposition as the current crisis is; western metaphysics and its historical neglect of the
question of beyng. The neglect of this questioning results in the ungrounded
interpretation of beings that are abandoned by Being, which simultaneously creates
the potential for the positive occurrence of beyng. The other significant potential
hindrance to the recognition of the Forgottenness lies in its hidden mode. The age of
technology, machination and lived experience mask the Forgottenness so effectively
that humanity’s progress is measured only in respect to them. Also, the attempt to
depict this as “inauthenticity” in Being and Time suffers shortfalls in its lack of the
deeper questioning of beyng. Therefore, the Forgottenness’ potentiality in its
continuance in the Abandonment is possible due to a lack of recognising its plight as
the “highest plight” that causes the succumbing to the age of machination and lived
experience. This shows the lack of deeper meditation on truth and the Questionworthiness of beyng and marks the first potentiality of the Forgottenness of beyng. It
will then perpetuate throughout history into its current manifestation as the
Abandonment and thereby, the Resonating of beyng.

The alternative (and simultaneous) potentiality in the Question-worthiness of beyng is
what involves the deeper meditation on the history of metaphysics and philosophy,
with special obligatory emphasis on the excavation of the guiding question. From here,
the guiding question as the foundation of the first beginning must be developed
through the historically relevant thinkers in a confrontation with the other beginning.
This, as observed in the previous section involves a very expansive and comprehensive
exploration of their ideas and even more significantly, their influential evolution
throughout history. Furthermore, the Question-worthiness of beyng is demonstrative
of this confrontation between the first and other beginning. The Question-worthiness
signifies the confrontation on a fundamental level, whilst alluding to the mystery of
beyng. In other words, “only questioning and the decision in favour of questionworthiness can be set in opposition to “worldview.”192 Also, the genuine battle that
was also described in the previous section would be relegated back to the
Abandonment by beyng should any mediation or concessions be made regarding a
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worldview (a presupposition as a ground). For example, as in the case with
Christianity, despite its teachings being seemingly dogmatic, it is in actuality a form
of compromise concerning the political that results in “propaganda” and
“apologetics.”193 Christianity then remains constricted to a particular worldview in this
compromise to maintain its influence. So, for philosophy to be freed from the shackles
of worldview in the Question-worthiness of beyng, a genuine battle will involve
finding its inceptual essence and ground for the question of the truth of beyng. Thus,
revealing philosophy as abyssal and thereby, freeing philosophy “into the free domain
of its meditation the fissure and the beyond itself, the strange and the perpetually
unusual.”194 This process is only possible through the Question-worthiness of the
essence of truth and beyng as the Event.

So, the Question-worthiness of beyng as the alternative positive potentiality of the
Forgottenness has two roadblocks. Firstly, machination and its foundation in truth as
correctness are what stands as the fundament of the unquestioning, and yet, it is
simultaneously inherent to the essential occurrence of beyng. As discussed earlier, the
Abandonment which sounds out the Resonating is intrinsic to the Forgottenness,
however, the contention here is in its progressive mode. It is important to note that in
the prescriptivity of correctness to truth in its unquestioning of beings “the more
decisive becomes the antipathy toward the Question-worthiness of beyng.”195 The
more machination dominates and the further it gets left unquestioned in the Grounding
of its essence, the further “machination itself withdraws, and thus beyng itself
withdraws,” since they are essentially intertwined.196 This leads to the second
roadblock; should machination withdraw to the extent that it is to take a definite form,
as in modernity, its “distorted essence” will be shrouded in lived experience.197
Therefore, the second critical consideration needs to be made in the “non-simultaneity
and through a dispelling of the semblance of their extreme oppositionality.”198
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Essentially, the problem here is in the difficulty of recognising the lived experience
from within the “drawing back” of machination and subsequently, its expression of
the guiding question as beingness (Being) and thinking (representational). For this
reason, it is important to make a distinct separation between the two features of the
Abandonment so that machination will not be recognised as the sole bedrock of the
Abandonment because, in actuality, it is reinforced in its shrouded nature by lived
experience. To reiterate then, the allowance for the Question-worthiness of beyng
necessitates the unfolding of the Forgottenness in its continuance in the Abandonment
by beyng and further still, in the modes of lived experience and machination. This is
one of the central expositions of the thesis, the two-fold relationship between the
Forgottenness and the Abandonment, for it is in the Forgottenness that we find the
deeper essence of the Abandonment. However, as will be shown in the subsequent
chapters, it’s occlusion is a result of lived experience and machination as advanced by
the Abandonment: “the more lived experience is unconditionally prescriptive for
correctness and truth (and thereby for "actuality" and constancy), all the more hopeless
does it become that from here a knowledge of machination as such could be acquired.”
199

In the next chapter, this will be expounded in detail to further illustrate the

intricacies involved in overcoming them through the Question-worthiness of beyng.

On a final note and summary of this chapter then, it is important to grasp that the
greater danger of the Forgottenness of beyng is evident in its hidden modes, which
exhibits its complex multiplicious area of action. This emphasises the critical
importance of dealing with the hidden nature of the Forgottenness which has been the
focal point of this chapter. This is also why the Forgottenness has persisted
historically, as it is masked by a multitude of symptoms that often remain shrouded
and it is no wonder as to why it has been overlooked. The sheer difficulty in explicating
from its expansive modes often leads thinkers of the past astray, and hence why, it is
important to recognise the entire historical tradition and its neglect of the questioning
needed to overcome the Forgottenness of beyng. This is further evidence for
199
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acknowledging Nietzsche’s philosophy as the last great philosophy, for he is the
closest in recognising but a semblance of the Forgottenness in Plato, but fails at the
deeper level of the questioning needed for its complete uncovering.
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CHAPTER IV: THE ABANDONMENT BY BEYNG
From the Forgottenness of Beyng to the Abandonment by Beyng.

The inception of Ancient Greek philosophy and its primordial role in the inauguration
of the first beginning serves as the foundation for the later developmental stages of the
Forgottenness in the Abandonment by beyng. However, this “continuance” of the
Forgottenness in the Abandonment requires a detailed exposition. Having cemented
its historical position in the guiding question, what remains of beyng regardless are
its:
1. Universality, a “most general” manifestational experience.
2. Obviousness, a hollow or emptiness that is nonquestionable and therefore, unproblematic.200
Universality and obviousness are the two predominant features of grasping beyng as
opposed to its experience from within the mode of the horizon of beings.201 Beyng is
never experienced in its historicality and its essential Grounding nature here, and
subsequently, withdraws from beings. This withdrawal also lets beings appear as what
“is” and “is more eminently” in its conception of truth as representational.202
Alternatively, to overcome this representation of beyng and intuit its universality and
obviousness, an apprehension of the essence of the Abandonment is necessary. As
mentioned in the first chapter, the “lack of a sense of plight as the greatest plight”
denotes the Abandonment’s interdependent relationship with the Forgottenness.203

Therefore, the second stage of recognising the Forgottenness is in its leading on as
“the continuance of the abandonment by being in the hidden mode of the
Forgottenness of being.”204 The Forgottenness here becomes shrouded in the
Abandonment’s manifestation and as such, allows for later stage concealment that
must be recognised. This later stage-recognition is based on a disclosure of beings as
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nothing more than that of calculation, manipulation and exploitation which hitherto,
had not surfaced. A view of the sense of the mystery of beings is replaced by their
technological, scientific and metaphysical representations.
The first stage of recognising the Abandonment is in how it “announces itself,” which
is observable through a cluster of conditions. The Abandonment firstly announces
itself through “culture,” or the general tendency to be absorbed into particular value
systems such as in organised religion. This cultural imposition is first, a neglect of the
deeper understanding of its essence and historicality in what is a “complete
insensibility to the ambiguity.”205 This leads to a secondary manifestation; the inherent
lack of what it is that defines a condition, an ‘idolising’ that is unconditioned, such as
in ethnocentrism. The establishment of these values and ideas are groundless, a
complete subscription to a worldview that is unalterable in the sense of lacking a
structural ground for questioning these very impositions.206 The Forgottenness that has
its history in the overlooking of this questioning of beyng is now announcing itself
through a groundless progression of ideas, values and cultural impositions. This leads
to a system that is uprooted and prone to further issues.

To begin with, the uprootedness of this system will be exposed in two fundamental
areas; “art” and the “not” regarding beyng itself.207 Firstly, art’s essence is left to a
form of utility, an entertainment piece for the masses.208 Detrimentally, art’s key
potential for the Grounding of the essence of truth (a cathartic expression of the artist
and the work as inseparable) is overlooked.209 This has a deeper level of neglect that
can lead to a distortion of the expression of peoples. A need for overcoming this
essence of art lies in a confrontation with aesthetics and its particular conception of
beings apropos western metaphysics. This overcoming is necessary for retrieval of the
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more originary essence of truth in art, and thereby history. Art, therefore, can become
historical and as such, overcome the priority of the beingness of beings and its
historiological conception. Secondly, in the case of the not, specifically through its
subset in the negative - that which is unfavourable, evil or counterintuitive is dictated
by a worldview and consequently misinterpreted as a form of negation or absence.
This is symptomatic of assertions based on objectivity, a determination of the
beingness of beings. The Abandonment’s conception of the not as a mere nullity is
proof of the self-imposed limitations that it inadvertently succumbs to in its framework
of thinking. Essentially, in the not, beyng’s uniqueness and finitude are left
unexamined in its lack of recognition of the negative’s belonging to the not and
subsequently, to beyng itself. The not’s inherence in Being dictates its essential
occurrence, the mode of Being and non-being in their simultaneity.210 Therefore, the
not is what is most foundational in beyng. This neglect as such, points to the limitations
of language and representational thinking’s incapacity to discuss the not, a
metaphysical constraint that is to be overcome in the thinking of the other beginning.211
Critically, art and the not are two fundamental features that inhere in beyng and are
demonstrative of the other beginning’s thinking which is not possible from within the
Abandonment’s manifestation.212

This characterisation demonstrates a comprehensive debilitation in the first
beginning’s contemporaneous influence. Fundamentally, the core of the Abandonment
announces itself in the rejection of the essence of truth. This rejection is demonstrated
in the lack of Grounding, a “blind mania for “what is true” with a semblance of serious
willing.”213 This is where the Abandonment can first be recognised in its real essence,
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an announcement that is shown in the insurgency of machination, unquestioning, and
the eschewal of deeper meditations. Here, all restraint is viewed as inactivity and
counterintuitive, a desperate need for perpetual involvement in lived experience.
These symptoms will be observed in detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter
but for now, this foundation still needs to be explored further.
Before the surfacing of the Abandonment’s symptoms, there is a deeper element that
is precursive to the initial transitionary phase of the Forgottenness into the
Abandonment; the lack of self-certainty or the “inability to wait.”214 Human beings
here are essentially always in the mode of looking ahead and disregarding the
uniqueness of the essence of beyng as rarity, momentariness, restraint, freedom among
others.215 Adding to this, there can be an even deeper misunderstanding in the
questioning of the Christian God in the West, where Nietzsche’s reinterpretation can
represent another falsehood, also in its uprootedness. So, the inability to wait and the
alternative in Nietzsche’s uprootedness showcase the “darkening” of the world to its
true uncovering. This proceeds further as the Abandonment becomes more prominent
in the lack of the sense of plight, such that the “will to get out is lacking.”216 For the
Abandonment to complete its surfacing in the “destruction of the earth” – a
“simultaneous “reign” of both the powerlessness of mere attitude and the brutality of
institutions” will occur.217

Importantly, the continuance of the Forgottenness in the Abandonment by beyng,
therefore, was not set in stone. Rather, its existence was enabled due to perpetual
historical neglect on a human level, which will also be a determining factor in its final
form as nihilism, which will be covered in the final section of this chapter. This is not
to disregard the historical impositions of the first beginning, but rather a failure based
on the lack of meditation, restraint and recognition of these crises. This will perpetuate
further as will be observed in the subsequent chapter. However, as a precautionary
measure, this is a problem that can be and should have been addressed on the human
level. Recognition, meditation and restraint are ways of exhibiting this capacity, of
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which will be observed later in the Future Ones. Again, this is not to negate the
historical influence of the Forgottenness and its ostensible beginning with Plato,
rather, this points to the need for it to be recognised in its earlier perpetuation.

The Abandonment by Beyng

Nietzsche was the first to recognise the crisis amidst the Abandonment as nihilism.
For this reason, Nietzsche’s philosophy is the denouement of the historical study of
philosophy and the more fundamental conception of nihilism in his reaction to
Schopenhauer’s often characterised pessimism. However, Nietzsche’s recognition of
the Abandonment does not lead him to develop the required questioning and “it still
must be said that he did not and could not grasp the essence.”218 Nietzsche’s
shortcomings showcase the potency of this crisis within the Abandonment as that
which depicts everything being calculable, nothing as impossible and the obstruction
of truth that leads to “where truth has long since ceased to be a question.”219 The
Abandonment displays the need for a more appropriate dissection of itself within this
greatest plight as firstly, in its disclosure as the lack of Grounding of Da-sein and then,
in its important relation to history. This is the predominant imperative which Nietzsche
overlooks in his lack of questioning.
The Abandonment then, will “cloak” itself in a threefold manner; “Calculation,”
“Speed” and “The burgeoning of the massive.”220 Calculation, as hinted to before, is
the reducibility of all things towards the scientific and mathematical, which leaves no
room for anything outside of the realm of the sciences and metaphysics. Speed marks
humanity’s obsession with “record-breaking performances; purely quantitative
increase, blindness to the truly momentary.”221 The human being’s current state of
existence is characterised by losing itself in the drive for what comes next, a perpetual
effort to increase productivity, be it economical, technical or scientific. The
burgeoning of the Massive, which is dependent on Calculation and Speed, denotes the
motivation for achieving quantity over quality, allowing everything to be accessible
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to everyone, anytime and anywhere: “number already reigns, as does the calculable,
i.e., what is accessible to everyone in the same way.”222 The threefold cloaking of the
Abandonment ultimately results in a distortion of beings in the guise of non-beings,
culminating in an inner disintegration as “the denuding, the making public and
common, of every disposition.”223 Here the human being experiences the
Abandonment in its full spectrum, an “era of the complete unquestionableness of all
things and of all machinations.”224 Words lose their deeper insight and meaning,
meditation or self-contemplation becomes “something strange and impotent.”225
Furthermore, the denuding denotes a cumulative effect, where the deeper the venture
within the era of unquestionableness, the more problems will accumulate and
compound on each other. The denuding will then characterise the human being’s way
of being amidst machination and lived experience. This is an over-emphasis on a
techno-scientific driven society and that which has discarded all “bewitchery” in the
spiritual-mystical tradition as a means of the unquestionableness which remains
disguised. However, on the contrary, the mystery that has been replaced by technology
is in actuality; “the hex cast by technology and by its constantly self-surpassing
progress is only one sign of this bewitchery that directs everything towards calculation,
utility, breeding, manageability, and regulation.”226 Therefore, the true bewitchery is
in its essence, “from the unbridled dominance of machination.”227
Calculation here, also plays a significant role in the ascertainment of the “average.”
The average offers an illusionary notion of progress in its complacency. The aboveaverage as such appears to be achievable and surpassable, whilst complacency is
discreetly enforced, reassured and justified. This complacency demonstrates the
capacity to achieve the above-average, although it is not needed, since the status of the
average is consistently elevated. Consequently, the Abandonment will then cement
truth as correctness in disguise through machination and lived experience. Here, even
the perspective of spirituality is affected, such as the former creator God being
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sidestepped for Being withdrawing from beings in the era of machination and lived
experience. The historical influence of the Forgottenness and its transformation is now
fully evident and all-pervasive. The cumulative effect of the denuding is then enforced
by lived experience and machination that progresses further and subsequently, the
concomitance of the Forgottenness with the Abandonment simultaneously exposes its
historically hidden nature within the plight and accordingly, the transition to the other
beginning.228

Machination and Lived Experience

The Forgottenness’ interdependence with the Abandonment is aggregated in
machination (Machenschaft) and lived experience (Erlebnis).229 As demonstrated in
the previous chapter, the concealment of machination within the beingness of beings
demonstrates its withdrawal, and as such – the actualisation of lived experience.
Therefore, machination conceals its essence and takes a definite form amidst lived
experience, which is where the difficulty in grasping its true essence is exhibited. This
form, particularly prominent in modernity denotes the era of complete
“unquestionableness” of all things where priority is given to the “making” [Machen]
(ποίησις, τέχνη).230 Lived experience, as coexistent with machination, presents the
human being as the calculating subject (animal rationale), “beings as represented to
oneself as the relational center.”231 This showcases the importance of recognising the
belongingness of machination to lived experience. Their common ground must be
understood to unfold machination in its true essence and thereby, grasp the formula
that constitutes the original version in the guiding question of the first beginning.

Machination and lived experience are a disguised co-dependent manifestation that
belongs to the Abandonment itself. The Abandonment that has completed its
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announcement from within the Forgottenness of beyng, is now expropriating its
influential power. Before proceeding deeper into the modes of the Abandonment, it is
important to uncover this common ground as based on:

1. Machination and lived experience belonging together.
2. Their sharing a common root.
3. The understanding of the extent of their disguise within the
Abandonment.
4. Nietzsche’s nihilism and its inadequacy as a prerequisite.
5. The origin of the Abandonment and its meaning for beyng
itself.
6. The direction to take to recognise the plight through the
Abandonment.
7. Da-sein’s role in the overcoming of the Abandonment.
8. Why Hölderlin’s poetry is futural.232
Here, the Abandonment’s portrayal through machination and lived experience can be
understood more primordially, with particular emphasis being placed on its
foundational structure. This effectively allows for the uncovering of machination in
its occlusion within lived experience. Additionally, lived experience can now also be
understood in its nature. On a fundamental level, lived experience is a relation of
beings as a representation to “oneself as the relational center” which incorporates this
experience into “life.”233 This is dependent on the historical influence of Ancient Greek
philosophy of the first beginning and its inception of the subject-object dichotomy. As
a whole, therefore, lived experience represents the outer shell of the deeper rootedness
of machination. Machination which takes its form in lived experience is drastically
more complex. Machination expresses the distorted essence of beyng apropos truth as
correctness in the primacy of the beingness of beings. Driven by a limitless capacity
to expand, such that “in accord with their lack of limits and impasses, everything is
open and nothing impossible.”234 It is clear then, that this two-fold dependency is the
232
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true face of the Abandonment, such that it is in its “true actuality” in them. Therefore,
machination in its hidden nature within lived experience demonstrates the true
manifestation of the Abandonment.
Machination shows itself in the human being’s capacity and sovereignty of the making
in the realm of what is made, a specific human engagement in an activity of the
beingness of beings. Beingness is the human being’s objective representation of beings
as correctness that becomes a demonstration of self-certainty. From the philosophy of
Descartes as the first decisive step into certainty and correctness – machination takes
form.235 In the opposing context of Christianity, an alternative interpretation is
presented which is still constricted within the same lived experience as ens creatum;
all things subservient to God as merely the reverse of the scientific and rationalist
model presented in Descartes. The Cartesian manifestation of subject and object will
persist concurrently with the monotheism of western society, and therefore, form the
two opposing views and basis for metaphysics in the modern age.236 Machination,
therefore, is omnipresent and unsurpassable from within lived experience. This also
includes mathematics and its systematic approach coupled with technology in a more
advanced manifestation. Correctness becomes all the more influential in the truth of
what is true and subsequently, reinforces lived experience. A scientific point of view
then, is no different, which is also intrinsic to machination and in its lack of
questioning, which only supports lived experience.

It is not a unique approach, however, to be critical of lived experience, as historically,
it is not a seldom occurrence. The issue at stake is the approach. There have been
numerous attempts at resolving lived experience that fail to question what is most
important, namely beyng, such as Science, Christianity, Marxism, Bolshevism etc. For
instance, in the case of Marxism, of which there lies no shortage of valid criticisms of
lived experience which is coupled with a sound economic alternative to boot, such as
235
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labour theory of value, alienation, commodification (all as symptoms of machination)
– yet they still signify the western European rise of industry, technology etc.237
Parallels can be drawn from Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism as a “slave revolt in
morals” where Christianity is the ostensible liberator. This critique, however, is still
being rooted in the Platonic inception. Machination, therefore, can only be unfolded
in its essence by appropriating its ground in the Abandonment and subsequently the
Forgottenness of beyng. Otherwise, machination remains concealed within lived
experience, and thereby, unengaged with.

The Denuding and the Gigantic in Lived Experience

The denuding (die Entblößung) shows the lack of meaning and genuineness that is
symptomatic of lived experience. The overarching influence of the denuding is evident
in the human being’s general unawareness of “what is genuinely happening” in the
“cloaking of the expanding emptiness” of the plight.238 The human being’s way of
being in the world is, therefore, characterised by the denuding. Also, the denuding is
not to be considered separate from machination, rather is symptomatic of a
machination dictated existence. This milieu corresponds to several dispositions that
are all cumulative in their effects. To begin with, the lack of “genuineness” in every
attitude demonstrates the human being’s enforcing a subsequent debilitation of
words.239 Words or utterances become mere sounds for representational purposes,
leaving no possibility for a deeper meaning in their essence.240 This leads to a lack of
self-contemplation or inner meditation, as this has become “strange and impotent,”
which is unconducive to lived experience. Additionally, the denuding is inherently
progressive within lived experience, such that in its actuality, it becomes less
recognisable and consequently, will continue to become more pronounced. This also
means that it gets “cloaked” within various modes and processes of the lived
experience such as in its institutional forms. The denuding, accordingly, represents the
central modus operandi of the human being within lived experience and is exemplary
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of the main path of resistance to the recognition of the plight and its role within lived
experience.
The denuding’s progression will lead on to its most devastating inception in the “era
of the complete unquestionableness of all things and of all machinations.”241 Here, the
lack of questioning that has been all-pervasive historically reaches its most current
form in the interdependent relationship with machination amidst the lived experience.
Beings are self-concealed in such a way that their self-concealing is not recognised as
a determination of lived experience. This will accumulate in such a way that any
questions that do arise, are devoid of meaning, much in common with human discourse
and as such, will lack the capacity to be addressed. This is highly dependent on the
technological age during the writing of the Contributions, in that machination only
matures with scientific progress. The machination dictated existence will then be
strengthened further in its foundation, such that all that is to be observed and achieved
are dictated by a “matter of number applied to time, space, and force.” 242 In this
“bewitchery,” the unquestionableness that is of the “hex” that is cast by machination
is so effective amidst lived experience that it allows for the unfolding of a subsequent
feature of lived experience, namely, the gigantic.

The gigantic (Das Riesenhafte) shares a close affinity with machination, such that it
may incur popular misconceptions. The gigantic is dependent on machination rather
than vice versa or in other words, the machination dictated existence propels itself as
the foundation for the gigantic. Its true form is only possible within the modern
calculative-technological age of modernity. Critically, truth as correctness or beings
viewed as objectively present that is symptomatic of the Abandonment on a
foundational level does not pertain to the gigantic’s fundament. The gigantic instead,
is unique as “quantity as quality.”243 Essentially, quantity is a determinate principle in
its own right, such that it sets its limits and is oriented as such. These self-imposed
limits are dependent on the grounding of the overabundance that “arises out of the
hiding of a lack.”244 Moreover, in its concealment amidst lived experience, its
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simplicity is a mere semblance of its true form. The true essence of the gigantic
symbolises the “nothing is impossible” attitude of lived experience, there are no limits
of the given or rather, nothing that is limited may be given.245 From within the
quantitative representation of beings, everything must be grasped in particulars or
individuals which in its essence, must transcend limits in its foundational structure
amidst lived experience. It is important to note that the descriptive nature of beings as
quantum – “parts of the same kind” is another form of representation that was inherent
in Hegel and Aristotle’s philosophy.246 So, the gigantic can also find its historical roots
in the first beginning (not fully formed at that stage) and the grasping of the gigantic
as such will then present it as incalculable and an inherent belonging to the “plight of
the lack of sense of plight.”247 The recognition of the aforementioned issues is allinclusive to the revealing of the plight which marks a cataclysmic occurrence in the
human being’s being in the world. The two predominant features that are consistent in
their exposition are their progressive tendencies and hiddenness. The latter points to
an even greater core issue, namely, the greatest plight as a consequence of the lack of
the sense of plight. Essentially, the lived experience’s later stage announcement is a
double effect of progression and ever-increasing concealment which subsequently,
results in total mobilization.

The Greatest Plight and Total Mobilization
The human being’s self-certainty here becomes the dominant characteristic of being
in the world, where truth has ceased to become a question and consequently, an
obstruction of the ground of Da-sein and history is inevitable.248 lived experience then,
exerts its influence on the human being in such a way that hinders the path towards
the recognition of the shrouded nature of machination and the gigantic, with the human
being’s blindness to what is ‘truly going on’ as an inherent manifestation of the
denuding. Hitherto, the various modes of the Abandonment have catalysd a more
entrenched plight (Die Not) as the greatest plight and the denuding’s manifestation
exerts a complacency that allows for the blinded pursuit of progress in every domain
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of calculation and representation.249 The resulting state of Being manifests in a total
mobilization or the general enclosure of the masses towards the services of further
progress.250 Total mobilization (totale Mobilmachung) then is “the mere setting in
motion and undermining of all previous contents of still-enduring formations.”251
Therein lies the encapsulating nature of the original Abandonment: “the rallying of all
the masses and pressing them into service.”252

The impersonal stance hitherto has been directed toward the analysis and subsequent
dissecting of the Abandonment and its modes of expression. Now that the historical
foundation has been explored, the focus now shifts towards the more direct influence
of the Abandonment on a collective and individual level. This nevertheless remains
intrinsic to the whole process of the recognising the Abandonment in the ascertainment
of the greatest plight and its function in total mobilization. The greatest plight,
therefore, must first be addressed to recognise the all-inclusive mode of total
mobilization, for its priority signifies the concealment of itself. Expressed differently,
in the recognition of the greatest plight, total mobilization would cease to be in effect;
for it only exists as a consequence of the hiddenness of the greatest plight. total
mobilization, therefore, forges the ignorant human being as a counter-result, never as
its goal or primary motive.253 As will be discussed in the next section, the new human
being as a nihilist is ignorant of this.

Before moving on, however, the notion of positing goals must be explored from within
the context of total mobilization. At first, conceptualising a process of total
mobilization in its inherent nature seems to propose a goal and yet, this is not to the
case. This substantiates the effectual blindness of the greatest plight, such that in its
natural concealment a forced total mobilization propagates the directionless human
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Ernst Jünger, The Worker: Dominion And Form, trans. and ed. Laurence Paul Hemming and Bogdan
Costea (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2017), 104. Heidegger here seems to be drawing
on Ernst Junger’s Total Mobilization in Technology as Mobilization of the World through the Form of
the Worker chapter from his The Worker Dominion and Form. Heidegger will call Junger the only true
Nietzschean, which is important considering the lead up from machination to nihilism that will be
observed in the upcoming sections.
251
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 112.
252
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 112.
253
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 113.

72 | P a g e

being amongst the collective. This effect demonstrates several characteristics, of
which all manifest concordantly. There is no way of tracking all its expansive
manifestations and as a consequence, its recognition lies in the greatest plight or
overcoming the human being’s ignorance of being within a plight in the first place.
Lived experience’s dominant exertive power, therefore, negates this in its goalless
total mobilization. This is also demonstrated in the ostensible counter-intuitiveness of
meditation and deeper questioning, as this is incongruent amidst the calculative view
of the beingness of beings in total mobilization. There must always be an overcoming
of beings only through propositional thinking and its subsequent distortion of the
essence of truth, as these among others characterise the denuding’s way of being
amidst lived experience. The meaninglessness of words as is characteristic of the
denuding, further demonstrate this in total mobilization as another self-reinforcing tool
of the human being’s incompetency. Language, therefore, as a method of expression
within total mobilization inadvertently negates the possibilities for deeper questioning,
meditation and consequently, the greatest plight’s concealment will persist and unfold
in its essence. The conclusions that can be drawn from the goal of total mobilization,
therefore, are; the goalless nature that exerts its influential power of concealment
within the lived experience and secondly, the greatest plight’s persistence is inherently
dependent on the directionless human being as a subset of this encapsulation. The
denouement of the aforementioned processes will result in the exploitation of the
inherent lack of a foundation and beginning as concomitant with the goallessness. The
first beginning and its recognition through a more grounded repetition of history are
devoid here and as such, will remain ungrounded within the distortion of truth. Beings
are, therefore, abandoned by Being and what is most Question-worthy, namely, beyng.
Beyng’s Question-worthiness in the essential occurrence of the Event is not within
Nietzsche’s philosophy as discussed in the previous chapters, even though Nietzsche’s
philosophy remains falsely prominent in its portrayal as conducive to change. So, this
particular mindset will be of fundamental ignorance and is demonstrative of the
individual’s place in the total mobilization of lived experience. This includes its
semblances in Nietzsche's lack of questioning as a response to his recognition of
Platonic philosophy as nihilism in disguise.

Nihilism
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The Abandonment and its expansive modes of progression have thus far, focused on
a negatively influenced and impersonal ontology of beyng. The apex of this process,
however, manifests directly in the human being and specifically, within total
mobilization and lived experience. The first beginning and its characteristics,
therefore, must be finalised by regressing to its foundation in the human being’s
interdependence with the Abandonment by beyng. From this foundation, the
meaningful repetition of history is symptomatic of the first beginning’s engagement
with the other beginning which presupposes an interpretation of the human being’s
“noisy intoxication” with lived experience.254 Having arrived at this decisive point in
the historical chronology, the human being’s way of being in the goallessness of total
mobilization is accordingly, fundamentally nihilistic. It is important to note here,
however, that this exposition of nihilism differs from Nietzsche’s. To begin with,
Nietzsche’s nihilism is a form of cultural psychology, a lacking of all goals that
transform the human being. In positing this, Nietzsche neglects the historical account
of the first beginning and the Question-worthiness that is the obligatory prerequisite.
Consequently, Nietzsche’s nihilism presupposes the Platonic idea coupled with an
idealist outlook – a provisional moral sentiment that is in itself groundless. However,
Nietzsche is justified in assessing the human being’s condition as nihilistic and yet,
this “has remained ungrasped to this day and, above all, has not compelled
meditation.”255 Additionally, Nietzsche’s assessment doesn’t just get overlooked, it
gets “shunned as diabolical” in his attempt at overcoming it.256 This is due to
Nietzsche’s failure to address the human being’s comportment towards beings which
directly results in the ignorance and unwillingness of the lack of goals. This ignorance
is effectively concealed in its nature, such that the human being is transformed into
one who is in the general pursuit of “cultural assets.” From here, the human being
derives the means towards achieving this groundless comportment towards beings
(goals) as itself being a goal, of which Nietzsche’s nihilism contributes by representing
an alternative that also has its roots in the Abandonment. Therefore, the human being’s
engagement with the world in the form of cultural assets and blinded goal-setting is
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the greatest nihilism.257 This is aided by the distractions of lived experience and its
deliberate obfuscation of true nihilism in its goalless nature.
This is demonstrative of the “dread” of beyng as having “so radically abandoned
beings” to lived experience and cultural politics.258 A genuine nihilism is not
Nietzsche’s nihilism as based on the will or life, instead, it must know nihilism and
the Abandonment by beyng as its essence.259 Also, this dread of beyng has reached its
greatest potency contemporaneously, as demonstrated in the gigantic.260 Other
characteristics that go beyond this are evident in a religious commitment on one end
and the crude nihilism of Bolshevism on the opposite end as an example. This battle
is doomed from the start, as both oppositional forces “will lead in one way or another
to the victory of nihilism.”261 Heidegger may be inferring to Soviet-Bolshevist Russia
and its suppression of Christianity in its early stages, which inevitably, resulted in its
subsequent collapse before the turn of the twentieth century. The resulting spiritual
resurgence within Post-Soviet Russia demonstrates this victory whilst remaining
within the machination dictated existence that both political regimes were always
constricted by. Evidently then, nihilism results in beyng’s abandoning beings to
machination and lived experience which includes all the antiquarian approaches aimed
at preserving culture. Even though nihilism manifests within the human being, it is not
a process that is constricted to the individual exclusively or their actions, rather, it is
the ground for the inner essence of nihilism for it to propel itself.

The meditation that is required to overcome this in itself involves a deeper
understanding of the human being’s position within lived experience. This is an
exhibition of the comprehensive understanding of the ungrounded history of beyng in
the first beginning and its progressive distortive capacity that has persisted throughout
history. From this position, a deeper meditation that is disdained within lived
experience must ground itself anew in Da-sein, where beyng will first occur in the
appropriating Event. This is not to overlook the human being as inessential, as this
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necessarily involves a preparation that is “paved by the basic experience that the
human being, as the one who grounds Da-sein,” and is intrinsic to the Last God.262
Thus far, this chapter has shown that the greatest challenge in achieving this lies in the
recognition of nihilism that has its roots in the Forgottenness of Beyng. Given that true
nihilism is so deeply entrenched in its essence in lived experience, machination and
the subsequent human being’s comportment towards beings, the Abandonment by
beyng therefore, remains concealed and all-pervasive. As covered earlier, Nietzsche’s
philosophy provides evidence for this assessment, and as such, must be used as a
historical example of the procedure necessary for overcoming this true form of
nihilism that is beyond mere opposition. To conclude then, the beginning of the
Forgottenness of beyng’s co-dependency with the Abandonment by beyng will exhibit
the human being’s role as one of fundamental ignorance – a lack of recognition of its
goalless nature. So, the final manifestation of the human being amidst the
Abandonment and its predisposition within the plight is in nihilism. For the human
being to extricate the machination dictum, this fundamental nihilism must be
recognised and acted upon through the Question-worthiness of Beyng.
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CHAPTER V: THE QUESTION-WORTHINESS OF BEYNG
The Plight in the Essential Occurrence of the Question-worthiness of Beyng

The plight serves as the impetus for the thinking of beyng and its inherence to the
originary mode of questioning. As such, the human being’s recognition of this plight
results in the needed originary mode of questioning, which concurrently reveals the
concealed power of the Forgottenness and thereby, the Resonating of beyng.263 The
plight’s hidden crisis for beings in its unquestioned negative manifestation can only
be intimated rather than experienced directly - which is now recognised as the
Abandonment. This discovery of the all-pervasive Abandonment that was initially
hidden amidst the greatest plight is concomitant with the essential questioning of the
foundations of the Forgottenness of beyng.

This response to the plight cannot be initiated through the notion of progress, neither
will a reinterpretation of the existing systems of thought suffice. Progress can have no
future, as “it merely takes things that already are and expedites them “further” on their
previous path.”264 So, the plight must be grasped and understood rather than avoided,
which in itself already requires the need for questioning and deeper meditation. This
means that the recognition of the plight must happen from outside of the current
manifold of thinking or in other words, out of the other beginning. The denuding and
lived experience cannot be held accountable from within themselves, otherwise, the
plight will remain hidden and the Forgottenness subsequently unacknowledged.
Furthermore, the plight will signify an occurrence that is not a “lack” or “evil” in the
objectively present sense, as its recognition also resides external to these
characterisations. It is that which “compels” and is “retained” by receding from all
representational thinking without remaining fixed objectively that will recognise the
plight.265 This compulsion will also require a transformation of the human being in its
response to the plight and the Question-worthiness of beyng. For, the human being’s
residence within the plight is characterised by an unsurpassable self-certainty based
on calculation and unquestioning that is descriptive of nihilism. The human being’s
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blindness to the hidden nature of the plight will result in not questioning the essence
of truth, an obstruction of the ground of Da-sein and the necessary Grounding of
history.266 To overcome this then, the recognition of the greatest plight necessitates an
“anticipatory interpretation” of thinking the historicality of beyng in four ways:

1. On the basis of the gods.
2. On the basis of the human being.
3. With regard to the history of metaphysics.
4. As the thinking “of” beyng.267
This groundwork’s implementation of the Interplay is the deliberate preparation for
the confrontation between the first and other beginning in response to the Resonating
of beyng. The Resonating, therefore, is the signal that is broadcasted from within the
greatest plight, and its detection results in the Interplay and its implementation through
the four ways. The Resonating can only be engaged through the recognition of the
need for questioning in “an age of that simple solitude” where the truth of beyng as
the foci will overcome the complete absence of questioning.268 This questioning of
beyng lies in the historicality of its projection of the very ground for which the
questioning itself must adhere to.269 Effectively, this is a questioning external to
metaphysics and is beyond Being or beings and begins with the strife of world and
earth.

The Strife of World and Earth

The Question-worthiness that arises in the Resonating within the plight necessitates a
hidden event in either the advent or the absconding of the gods. This is due to what is
salvageable of the earth being utilised in the creation of truth and its sheltering in
beings. So, the strife of world and earth is founded upon the Question-worthiness’
inherent belonging to the gods. This inevitably clashes with the Abandonment as that
which destroys all forms of questioning and solitude. It is important to recall, however,
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that both consequences serve within the plight: “something of the essence of beyng is
Resonating and the abandonment of beings (as machination and lived experience) by
beyng is dawning.”270 This protrusion sheds light on the transition to the other
beginning through the Question-worthiness of beyng and the strife of world and earth,
the guiding question and the basic question.

The strife of world and earth represents the opening to the mystery of beings, the
positive occurrence that is a surrendering to the truth of beyng in its sheltering of
beings. Effectively, the earth as that which founds a world is fundamental even within
the Abandonment and its expansive modes. In its revealing of a world, the earth
necessarily conceals itself, which is critically, entirely unacknowledged and hidden
due to the lack of questioning in the Abandonment. Alternatively, in the Questionworthiness of beyng, the advent of the gods play a critical role in liaison with the
transformed human being in revealing a world that is recognised in its concealment
and unconcealment. The transformed human being and the gods are the “playing out”
of the strife in Da-sein, a mode in which truth is “sheltered out of the securing of the
cleared-concealed event.”271 As observed in the previous chapter, this sheltering and
concealing is revealed through art’s relation to the essence of truth. This can only
happen in beings and their standing in beyng; “Beings are. Beyng essentially
occurs.”272

As will be observed later in the chapter, the response to the strife must be one of
restraint in the face of the stillness and the stewardship of the gods. However, the strife
must first be invigorated and then embraced by the Future Ones as those that create
Being anew in the strife itself. The questioning of beyng is what grants this through
its compulsion of the plight, a response to the call of the Resonating. The earth,
therefore, plays the role of that which is historical, the foundational platform where
the history of metaphysics will be developed resulting in its formation of a world.273
The history of metaphysics must then be seen as an inherent coextensive element of
the essential occurrence of beyng. The significant obstacle to the strife of earth and

270

Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 87.
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 26.
272
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 26.
273
Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 216.
271

79 | P a g e

world is the neglect of earth in its creation of a world. The Abandonment is only
pertinent within its own world, secluded and ignorant of earth. The Abandonment,
therefore, cannot be apprehended directly and exclusively from within its world, there
must be strife. machination and lived experience remain unquestioned within the
Abandonment’s world which traces its historical roots to the first beginning. The
Abandonment’s recognition will be based on the human being’s playing out of this
strife in response to the Resonating. The advent of the gods will then percolate through
this transformed human being in the sheltering of the truth of beyng in beings and
consequently, the strife will shelter the truth of Event, a rescue of the earth and a
renewal of a world.

On the Basis of the Gods

The alternative potentiality of the Forgottenness in the Question-worthiness of beyng
is conceptualised through a pre-determination of philosophy. Philosophy in this sense
belongs to the essential occurrence of beyng and as a result, is historical.274 Here the
distinction between the historiological and the historical is made; where the historical
belongs to the recognition of the plight as opposed to the linear progressive
observation of events in the historiological. The historical, therefore, is inherently
bound to both the essence and the essential occurrence of history itself and
subsequently, prepares philosophy for the future human being. This can only be
achieved through the Grounding of language in Da-sein and its “construction of the
most proximate foyers in whose spatial structure the words of Holderlin can be
heard.”275 Holderlin’s poetry as observed earlier “corresponds to an ability to say
which speaks out of the Question-worthiness of beyng,” a real-world intimation of
thinking and saying out of the other beginning.276

The missing link in speaking out of the Question-worthiness of beyng however, is in
the gods and its relation to the essence of truth. At its core, this thinking cannot be
relayed back to the scientific thinking and the “literary-historiological,” as it must
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belong to that which is being thought and as such, is itself the essence of truth.277 Truth,
which is that which opens the space for the concealing and self-concealing, allows for
the coterminous nature of humans and the gods to be appropriated. This is critical, as
only through this appropriation can the Question-worthiness and its inherent capacity
provide for thinking out of the other beginning. The Question-worthiness “thinks”
history which “ordain future humans to the stewardship of the indigence of the
gods.”278 Essentially, the gods in their role as world-revealers will demonstrate
thinking as questioning and simultaneously, undecidability. This indication of the gods
as divinity is not a form of affirmation or point of departure, it is instead, their very
undecidability. This undecidability of the Being of the gods is a questioning that acts
as a decision “from which originates either what has been decided or complete
undecidedness.”279 So the gods are not to be posited from the notion of the beingness
of beings, rather, it must come from decision qua indecision. This is to be understood
as the overcoming of metaphysics and its notion of God or gods as representative of
the most perfect or highest Being. Alternatively, the gods require beyng for the gods
to belong to themselves, a “neededness of beyng” that necessitates the essential
occurrence through themselves.280 To avoid being tautological here, the gods are
revealed by the neededness of beyng, which is the foundational stepping stone for
thinking “the gods.” This means beginning with the thinking of the historicality of
beyng in active engagement with the first beginning en route towards the other
beginning.

To provide a closer look at what it means to think out of the other beginning given the
obsequious nature of the human being concerning the gods; the gods will serve as that
which allow for this new thinking. However, the gods do not demonstrate this thinking
themselves. They must be grounded in Da-sein, and subsequently the future human
being. Three requirements are evident in the thinking out of the other beginning based
on the gods:

1. The gods must be grasped through the neededness of
beyng.
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2. This leads to a Grounding of the truth for beyng.

3. This grasping also entails thinking of the historicality of
beyng, which in its essence means thinking on “the basis
of the human being.”
The gods are an inherent occurrence of beyng, which allows for inventive thinking as
philosophy in the other beginning. So the gods coexist with philosophy and need
philosophy to occur “because there must be philosophy if “the gods” are once again
to come into decision and if history is to attain its essential ground.”281 This
formulation of thinking out of the other beginning is inventive thinking on an
unrestricted basis apropos the gods, which holds little in common with divinity. This
thinking is removed from all worldviews and demonstrates thinking that Richard Polt
describes as “a vibrant center of our interests and interpretations, a re-legion that
would bind a community together and bind it back (re-ligare) to the world at large.”282
This marks the first stage of the thinking out of beyng as the Event and leads to the
human being’s place in its appropriation.

On the Basis of the Human Being
The determination of beyng’s occurrence presupposes the historical human being not
as the animal rationale of Descartes or the will to life of Nietzsche, as these are what
will be overcome in the other beginning.283 The historiological representation of the
human being is defined by its relationship to the beingness of beings and as such, is
descriptive of the ‘rational’ living being. To proceed beyond this limiting
characterization in the thinking of the first beginning; a transformational requirement
of the human being is essential. The historical human being is one that is transformed
through the thinking of beyng and is intertwined with its transformation.

As is common within the history of metaphysics and its relationship to the gods, they
do not serve as the point of departure for the questioning of beyng, for the questioning
281
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itself involves this very transformation.284 Otherwise, any questioning that begins with
the human being and its metaphysical representations as such, remain forgotten.285 The
history of the first beginning imposes a complex and a “rapidly increasing perplexity
over the “metaphysical” essence of reason” that Nietzsche will erroneously
encapsulate into life.286 Here we see a manifestation of reason as a secondary quality
of the human being or the Nietzschean life which will found the basis for thinking.
Thinking will then inadvertently succumb to lived experience and machination, for it
lacks the required grounding to penetrate deep enough into the true essence of the
questioning needed. This thinking is constricted in its comportment to beings as based
on reason, with all its priorities being relegated back to life. By understanding this
latest manifestation of the human being and its capacity for thinking and reason, the
thinking of beyng can essentially occur as the Event. This effectively is the uncovering
of the Forgottenness of beyng, a recognition of its historical nature and its consistent
transformation throughout the first beginning into the Abandonment by beyng.

To achieve the originary essence of the human being which catalyzes the essential
occurrence of beyng - an unfolding-transformation of the human being must be an
intrinsic part of this process. This transformation is the thinking of beyng that includes
the history of the essential occurrence of the Event. Philosophy, therefore, is only to
be determined by the originary-historical human being. The historical human being is
hidden within the historiological representation of the first beginning and metaphysics
which then, must be overcome in its self-recognition. This will materialize in the
thinking of the other beginning and the essential occurrence of the Event. The thinking
through philosophy as what is most question-worthy namely, the truth of beyng will
be inherent to the whole process. Philosophy then, as sovereign knowledge will
overcome propositional thinking and represent the inceptual thinking of the
transformed human being. Moreover, philosophy will exhibit the Grounding of the
transformed human being in Da-sein, the “essential intervening incidence, i.e., the
incident of that “between” into which humans must be dis-lodged in order to first be
themselves again.”287 The human being, therefore, in its necessary transformation must
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ground itself in Da-sein as that which will free the historical human being from within
the Abandonment (machination, lived experience) and unto the Question-worthiness
of beyng. Importantly, Da-sein needs Being to ground the human being and is
necessary for the truth’s essential occurrence, a releasement from the shackles of total
mobilization and its nihilistic dispositions. Consequently, the Being of the human
being will be free to be grounded in Da-sein and thereby, the appropriating Event.

From here, the process will then signify a releasement towards what is most originary
in the human being, namely, thrownness. This is beyond the conception of thrownness
in Being and Time, which was misinterpreted as an accidental occurrence.288
Thrownness here is beyng’s neededness of the human being and as such, a Grounding
in Da-sein. To clarify further, the human being can only be a self in an overcoming of
the liberal “I” and its inherence to the Abandonment. Therefore, the human being as a
self is “attained only through the steadfastness in Da-sein.”289 Steadfastness denotes
the capacity for the human being to become historical, a movement towards the
“there,” a Grounding of Da-sein. So, the thrownness of the human being is only
possible in the steadfastness that allows for a historically belonging to the truth of
Being. Finally, steadfastness will designate the restraint needed for the Grounding in
Da-sein and the historical becoming.

On the Basis of the History of Metaphysics

To fully appreciate the thrown nature of the human being within the other beginning,
the human being must allow for restraint in belonging to beyng as the essential
occurrence of the Event. Again, this is beyond any conceptions of “I” or “we,” instead,
it is a historical recognition of the first beginning and its lack of Grounding in Da-sein,
which characterises the history of metaphysics.290 This is before a self can be attained,
for a meaningful return is what first allows for the Grounding of any such inceptions.
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This precedes all propositional thinking in its attempt to think inceptually and thereby,
ground itself in Da-sein. This is questioning that is not a refutation or counter to
metaphysics, as this would be constrained to the very opposition it is attempting to
overcome. Therefore, the restraint in the presence of beyng is not a replacement of the
metaphysical interpretation of Being (as by Aristotle or Hegel), rather, it is the opening
for the Question-worthiness of beyng. The history of metaphysics starting with Plato
(specifically the Cave allegory) and the Pre-Socratics must be unfolded in its inherence
to the Question-worthiness of beyng.

To begin with, the history of metaphysics hides implicitly through beingness as
presence, which results in beyng as self-concealment and beings having the priority.
Beingness then becomes subsequent and therefore “apriori.”291 This articulation is to
be addressed as per the historical human being’s Grounding in Da-sein and is what
shields the transformed human being’s thinking from the propositional thinking of the
first beginning. This conceptualization of the other beginning’s confrontation with the
first beginning also explores the history of metaphysics rather than the individual ideas
and theories. From this development, the gods in their neededness of beyng and their
subsequent Grounding of the truth for beyng, think out of the historical human being.
This will facilitate a more originary approach to the history of metaphysics, a priority
given to the main questions of metaphysics and their historical influential
interpretation. Upon this realization, history is grasped in its essence, “a beginning
along with its derivations and its advancements” which will cast a new light over all
the previous ideas and works of metaphysics.292 The history that is grasped and made
more visible can now be interrogated based on a more originary questioning. This will
lead to the opening for beings as beings and determine the human being with this
opening. The human being will concomitantly open this historical relation to the
questioning of metaphysics and thereby, allow for this historical inception of the
futural thinking in the other beginning. This can only be done through the opening of
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the questioning of the history of metaphysics and must simultaneously be grounded in
its “refusal” in the essence of beyng.293

The refusal denotes the grasping of the history of metaphysics and its more originary
questioning that will not allow for a particular human being as fixed amidst this
questioning. Rather, the refusal pertains to a “renunciation” as beyng’s essential
occurrence, a consistent capacity to allow for the opening of the Question-worthiness
of beyng.294 This is not a form of indecisiveness or rejection of various modes of
interpretation of the history of metaphysics, but a “highest form of possession” that
creates the opening for the Grounding of the transition from the first to the other
beginning.295 Therefore, the refusal designates the human being’s true historical nature
as per the history of metaphysics. In its renunciation, the human being ceases to
become a human being in the traditional propositional sense, neither will there be a
definition that comes with this particular transformation, it will instead grant the
belonging of the human being to the Question-worthiness as the essential occurrence
of the Event. From here, the Grounding of the human being in Da-sein will
simultaneously become the steward for the advent of the Last God. Returning to the
transformation of the human being of the previous section, here we see the process
unfold essentially in its interdependency with the history of metaphysics and its
subsequent refusal. This ultimately, is what constitutes the Grounding of the essence
of beyng and thereby, inaugurate its thinking.

As the Thinking of Beyng

The thinking that characterised much of western history and the first beginning is
propositional and has been guided by “beingness and thinking” (guiding question).
This hitherto has been an obstruction towards the inventive thinking of beyng. In its
overcoming, the guiding question must be recognised as the dominant factor of much
of western society’s thinking and the subsequent history of ideas. Recognition of this
also entails the need for another approach; inventive thinking as the “highest elevation
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of the predominance of thinking.”296 Inventive thinking is the question of the truth of
beyng, thinking that is out of beyng itself and simultaneously, the Event. This for the
first time, will ground the history of metaphysics, the human being and the gods all
conterminously with the thinking of beyng. The confrontation of the other beginning
with the first beginning is what demonstrates this inventive thinking as the grasping
of what is most question-worthy, namely, the truth of beyng.

To annunciate what would be involved with this inventive thinking out of the other
beginning would prove difficult, as human beings are still bound to the guiding
question’s historical reflection and therefore, would provide a mere semblance. To
avoid this, two distinctions must be made:

1. Thinking is signifying the mode of questioning which is
explicated through the interdependent relationship of the
human being and the Being of beings. Thinking here is
inextricably bound to that of which is being thought –
thinking as the questioning of Being.
2. Thinking as the guideline and fundamental employment of
the human being’s capacity for the asking of the question
of Being. Thinking, therefore, is what projects the horizon
of that which beings are in respect to Being and
beingness.297
It is from here that the other beginning can be projected, as based on the essence of
the questioning through philosophy. Philosophy, therefore, as the most essential of
that which allows for thinking is a binary application; questioning the Being of beings
and questioning the truth of beyng.298 From this framework of thought, we have a
complete surrendering to the mystery of beings. Freedom from that which represents
thinking as an object of representation “so as to leave entirely to beyng itself the
disposing-determining power in the essential characterization of thinking (inventive
thinking).”299 The historical reference for this can be examined in the ancient Greek’s
unity of thinking and being i.e., in the λόγος of Heraclitus, which was the guideline for
thought before any interpretation of Being. Still, as observed earlier, this thinking
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lacked the proper Grounding and resulted in the Platonic inception which for
Heidegger is the root of the distortion of truth.300 Therefore, the other beginning’s
Question-worthiness is even more primordial than this unity, such that this unity itself
becomes question-worthy.
The resulting Grounding of the “presence” will serve as “that this which is the most
self-evident harbors the most alienating decision.”301 Presence as the present will then
be prioritized as the basis for the decisional character of the uniqueness of beyng.
Herein lies the crux of the thinking of beyng, a releasement towards the uniqueness of
beings as beings in the essential occurrence of the Event. This is also why the
description of this entire endeavour is marred with so many obstructions, such that the
very act of descriptively grasping it - is always already a presupposition. Instead, it is
to be abyssal of time-space in its essential occurrence which empowers it as the
appropriating Event. In other words, time points to the questioning of the unity in the
Pre-Socratics whilst appropriating the ground of this unity. This futural thinking of the
other beginning is the “between” for the appropriation of the gods and the stewardship
of the human being. Finally, the inventive thinking is not to be an act or measure that
can be undertaken, rather it must be an orientation in preparation for the advent of the
gods as they allow for the truth of beyng. Another way at perceiving this could be in
the notion of a unique predetermination of that which is being thought and yet, still
not something fixed or absolute. This entails an overcoming of Heidegger’s
observation; “who bothers about beyng? Everyone chases after beings.”302 The
thinking of beyng therefore is not a replacement for Being, it is what stands in the
recognition of the failed attempts to provide proof of its correctness or beingness.303
Approaching the impossibility of providing a descriptive account of beyng showcases
this thinking of beyng as prefatory.

The Other Beginning and the Event

Heidegger’s historical account of Plato here will be analysed further in the last chapter of the thesis.
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It is not possible to present an accurate and concise account of the thinking out of the
other beginning especially as that would be framed in the descriptive and objectiverepresentational thinking and saying of the first beginning. The other beginning must
attempt to think and speak out of the truth of beyng itself and as such, maintain a
constant re-interpretation and confrontation with the first beginning.304 This link in the
confrontation with the first beginning is the first step towards gaining a foothold in the
other beginning and becomes demonstrative of the historical Interplay.305 So, rather
than a refutation or counter to the first beginning – the other beginning is the freeing
from the guiding question of the first beginning to the basic question of the other
beginning. This freeing is a transition, a historical grasping of the overcoming of the
entire history of metaphysics in its essence. An overcoming that recognises the history
of metaphysics and its foundation that is based on beings and its transformation into
beingness or ἰδέα. From here, the transition to the other beginning is grounded in Dasein as the truth of beyng, which is sheltered in beings. The other beginning will then
let Da-sein arise out of the truth of beyng as the Event in its refusal and finally, prepare
for its overcoming.306 In preparation for the Event, beyng must be placed in question
and the Forgottenness of beyng must be appropriated in its recognition. As such, the
Event is what determines and unfolds the coming of the other beginning and therefore,
must be grasped in its essence.307

Beyng is the appropriating Event and as such, grounds its essential occurrence.308 This
essential occurrence, for Heidegger, is demonstrated as follows:
1. Ap-propriation, beyng’s compulsion of Da-sein to the
Grounding of the truth of beyng. The ap-propriation
demonstrates the gods’ need for beyng and Dasein’s
assignment to the gods.
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2. De-cision, an allowance for the abyssal ground so the gods
and humans comingle freely as a result of the appropriation.
3. En-counter, the ap-propriation and de-cision create the
bridge over the abyssal ground that is the “most extreme
against.” This bridge is the en-counter of the neededness
of beyng and the world of beingness.
4. Un-settling, a demonstration of the en-counter’s initiation
of the strife that consequently occurs, and thereby, frees
beings from their lostness in beingness. The strife here is
of the gods and humans of the de-cision.
5. With-drawal, as the withdrawal from calculative and
representational thinking. The with-drawal only occurs
with the simultaneous un-settling’s allowance for the
clearing of the “there” of the Event.
6. Simplicity, the utter simplicity of beyng as more than a
relationship between the gods and humans. The simplicity
is instead the ground of this strife and “between” the gods
and humans as surfacing from the en-counter. Beyng
subsequently, essentially occurs and rests in this
simplicity.
7. Uniqueness, beyng that occurs in a rich and structured way
in its simplicity is not labelled as a being. The uniqueness
of beyng is in its inherent impossibility to be differentiated
from beings.
8. Solitude, the occurrence of beyng only through the strife
of world and earth which is predicated by beyng’s
intertwinement with nothingness; “beyng casts around
about itself only nothingness, whose neighbourhood
remains the most genuine one and the most faithful
guardian of solitude.”309
The eight ways “wholly” think the Event’s essential occurrence interdependently with
the thinking of beyng that was discussed in the previous section. The impossibility in
ascertaining a concise formula or signification of this process represents the thinking
out of the other beginning and its overcoming of the thinking of the beingness of
beings. Prima facie, the eight ways seem to dictate a system or linear procedure that
contradicts Heidegger’s earlier assertion in the text that the age of systems has passed.
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However, it is important to note here that the eight ways much in line with its
inauguration in the six junctures are precisely what characterises the lack of systems,
a flux-like co-dependency of factors that all play an interlaced role in intimating what
it means to think out of the other beginning. Despite the radicality of envisaging such
a potential thought process, by using the eight terms that Heidegger lays out, imagining
this ‘process’ can actually be achieved with clarity. This begins with the ap-propriation
as beyng’s need for Da-sein, and the resulting de-cision of the humans and gods. Here,
the call for an allowance or space (ap-propriation) is made for this other form of
thinking, resulting in a liberative-settlement (de-cision) in the free exchange between
the gods and Da-sein. This leads to the essential occurrence of beyng that is nonobjective in its bipartite de-cision of the gods and humans and its subsequent
assignment to Da-sein. This path being traversed is not odd or peculiar in the
traditional sense, rather, it en-counters the abyssal ground and un-settles the thinking
of the first beginning. In other words, propositional and calculative thinking are left
behind (un-settled) in the engagement (en-counter) with abyssal thinking.

The finality of this process is intimated when beyng is essentially thought out of the
un-settling that is achieved in the subsequent with-drawal from all calculative thinking
and their view of systems. This is the en-counter that must be experienced, the creation
of the bridge from the beingness of beings (built on the history of metaphysics)
onwards to the thinking of beyng (the other beginning). It is evident, however, that the
other beginning can only really be propelled from out of the first beginning and in its
current inhibiting framework such that, to truly think out of it means to have
experienced it; a transformation of the human being through the gods and the history
of metaphysics. The culmination of this in the thinking of beyng, is experienced as a
‘new’ thinking characterised by simplicity, uniqueness and solitude. A thinking that is
free from the limitations of the first beginning, without having negated them in their
entirety. By imagining this process, it becomes clear why an exclusively propositional
and representational thinking cannot similarly achieve this, it remains, however, an
essential prerequisite to the call for an ‘other beginning’. It must be concluded,
therefore, that the Contributions serves as the call for the recognition of the
Forgottenness and in response to this call – a succumbing to the essential occurrence
of beyng. This is but, a mere attempt or semblance of the desired outcome in namely;
the Event, and the other beginning.
91 | P a g e

CHAPTER VI: ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS
Heidegger’s History of Metaphysics and the First Beginning
From a historiological standpoint, Heidegger’s description of the history of
metaphysics may seem overly simplistic, although this is his attempt to avoid the
preoccupation with dates and events which exhibits a facsimile of the true influential
power of history. What should be studied instead, are the central ideas that have shaped
the history of western philosophy. The issue in Heidegger’s assertion, however, is that
the paradigmatic shift in thinking and saying occurs in the Platonic inception of the
idea, which he denotes as the beginning of the devastation from the Ancient Greek
thinking that was customary of Parmenides, Heraclitus and Anaximander. This will
form the entire basis of Heidegger’s historicality, such that the entire reinterpretative
power of history lies in the significance of this first beginning’s inception. This
presents two inconsistencies: first, in the Presocratic “thinking and saying,” and
second, in Heidegger’s reading of Plato.
Heidegger’s assertion that the thinking and saying of the Pre-Socratics signify a unique
composition of thought and expression as unificatory is not unfounded, however, its
lack of instituting or grounding is not obvious. There is ample evidence to suggest that
Plato was influenced by Parmenides which can also provide a plausible assessment of
Platonic philosophy as a continuation of the Parmenidean thought process. The lack
of instituting or grounding of Parmenides, for instance, would seem to reflect
Parmenides’s influence on Plato and would consequently form the foundation of
Platonic thought. This thinking and saying that was customary of the Pre-Socratics,
therefore, would surface in a reimagined form in Plato’s dialogues. Perhaps this is
what Heidegger was insinuating in the lack of grounding, it is not, however, clearly
outlined in the Contributions. From another point of view and staying with Parmenides
- he is not seldom referred to for an example of the first sustained argument in western
philosophy. Karl Popper presents such an argument in his The World of Parmenides
Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment, where Parmenides was in fact, the first
philosopher of nature.310 Popper here credits Parmenides with the discovery of the
310
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spherical shape of the earth and Heraclitus with phases of the moon.311 Popper will go
into significant detail outlining the poem of Parmenides in a series of propositions to
prove his point, which provides a unique alternative to Heidegger’s study of the PreSocratics. Taking this into account, Parmenides and Heraclitus can then be credited
for not making proposition-less statements, but sustaining arguments in a unique
expression that is representative of the times they inhabited. To take another example,
the Italian theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli in his The First Scientist Anaximander
And His Legacy credits Anaximander with being the first to pave the way for physics,
geography, meteorology and biology through his “rethinking our worldview – a search
for knowledge based on the rejection of any obvious-seeming “certainty,” which is
one of the main roots of scientific thinking.”312 This is in complete opposition to
Heidegger’s view of Anaximander, in that Rovelli’s interpretation is based on
Anaximander as a scientist in the modern sense, an objective thinker per excellentiam.
This paves the way for another entirely different historical account of the Pre-Socratics
and thereby the first beginning, with numerous other examples than can be drawn
from. Also, it makes the clear-sighted notion of the transition from the Pre-Socratics
to Plato anything but clear, with the notion of truth as correctness, not necessarily a
Platonic distortion, if there even ever was a concise and exclusively dominant account
of truth as unconcealment in the Pre-Socratics.

This brings the analysis to the next important point, namely, the historical evidence of
the Pre-Socratics. Only fragments of the key Pre-Socratics remain that Heidegger
includes in his first beginning, such as Parmenides, whose only known work On
Nature survives in a fragmentary state. Heraclitus does not fare much better, in his
work also existing in fragments, with further difficulty in deciphering its highly cryptic
expression, which can lead to equally idiosyncratic interpretations of it. In
Anaximander, only one fragment survives, with much of what we know about his
philosophy being transmitted historically through others. So, given the very limited
availability of primary sources, it proves difficult to ascertain any certainty in the
framework of thinking to these thinkers. This also leads to the second major critique;
Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato.
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As noted in the second chapter, Heidegger charges Plato specifically in his Cave
allegory with the transformation of truth from unconcealment to the idea. It is
important to consider that Heidegger expands on this in more detail in his work The
Essence of Truth on Plato’s Cave Allegory And Theaetetus.313 The Contributions does
not go into the same level of detail, the premise, however, is the same. Given the lack
of evidence in the Pre-Socratics’ establishment of truth as unconcealment, and Plato
as likely influenced by the Parmenidean thought process – this also will prove
problematic. Plato does demonstrate his Forms theory in detail in the Cave allegory,
however, to attribute the entire distortion of truth to it is to neglect the entire Platonic
corpus within a narrow focus. Heidegger’s thinking of beyng as through the advent of
the gods in what Thomas Sheehan calls the “appropriated thrown-openness” that
cannot be known also parallels Plato in some cases.314 For example, in the Timaeus,
Plato describes “prophetic insight” as active only when reason and sense are asleep
and the “power of divination” is always the product of some chaotic disorder that is
unintelligible and only decipherable by the “interpreters of prophecy.” 315 This
resembles the Future Ones as those that cannot fall prey to calculation and
propositional thinking but yet, think “out-of” the other beginning. Furthermore,
Francisco J. Gonzalez shows that the transformation of truth from unconcealment to
correctness is not demonstrated sufficiently in the Cave allegory, such that the
transformation itself is dependent on truth as unconcealment as the foundation.316 So
Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth on Plato’s Cave Allegory And Theaetetus, trans. Ted Sadler
(New York: Bloomsbury Publishing), 2013. Heidegger remains silent on the expansive corpus of
Platonic dialogues that have been inherited throughout the ages in contrast to other Ancient Greek
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conducted throughout history much in contrast to other Ancient Greek philosophers. Philosophers
would beg the question to do the same for other Ancient Greeks, especially in the case of the PreSocratics where only fragments remain. This also presents further problems with Heidegger’s reading
of the Ancient Greeks and their respective influences on the history of philosophy in that Heidegger
may in fact be misinterpreting the Platonic influence on the history of the Forgottenness.
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in effect, more correctness for Heidegger is concomitant with more unconcealment –
an inherent contradiction that requires a deeper analysis. Plato’s projection of truth by
all accounts then, represents a continuation of the Presocratic truth, a natural
metamorphic process that was inherent in the Presocratic thinkers, such as
Parmenides, as discussed earlier. Should unconcealment be demonstrated by the PreSocratics, it will be even more prominent in Platonic philosophy.
The transformation of truth and thinking did occur historically, however, Heidegger’s
oversimplified outlook is enmeshed with problems. The first beginning is a good
representation of the history of philosophy, it does, however, seem that the distortion
of truth is more symptomatic of Plato’s historical interpretation. Plato and the PreSocratics for that matter held similar views regarding truth – with enough evidence to
suggest that propositions can be drawn from both sources whilst also showcasing a
unificatory exposition of thinking and Being. This could be proven otherwise
theoretically, should we have access to more material in the case of the Pre-Socratics,
however, in the case of Plato, it is quite clear that Plato’s philosophy is influenced by
the Pre-Socratics.317 Furthermore, Aristotle is more akin to a philosopher of logic and
science with very important discoveries attributed to him in those areas and is mostly
contrasted with the often mystical characterisation of Plato. So, should correctness as
objectively present be the source of the distortion of truth and thereby the foundation
of the Forgottenness; Aristotle should essentially be held more accountable than
Plato.318 However, Carol J. White shows that “Heidegger thinks that Aristotle is “more
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Greek” than Plato because his thinking is closer to that of the Pre-Socratics than is
Plato’s.”319 In other words, the first beginning may prove an important historical
reading of philosophy, however, the clear account of the Platonic projection is less the
foundation for the Forgottenness, rather, more an inception that may have been a
victim of Heidegger’s historical interpretation. The two manifestations of Platonic
philosophy that Heidegger shows as historically responsible for the Forgottenness are
the Platonic Forms, and secondly, the subsequent reliance on knowledge and
understanding in pursuit of them. For Heidegger, this means that beings are neglected
in pursuit of the immutable world of Forms, and as such distorts truth from
unconcealment in favour of correctness and representation in as part of knowledge and
understanding. Such is the history of metaphysics and philosophy that founds the
Forgottennesss. This chapter has shown thus far, however, that this is largely a
mischaracterisation of the history of philosophy that is a symptom founded on
Heidegger’s particular interpretation of Plato. Therefore, on Heidegger’s account of
the lack of instituted grounding of the Pre-Socratics; he may have made a valid point
in that regard, although one that he ironically appears to have fallen victim to.

Analysis of the Forgottenness of Beyng

The Contributions’ account of the Forgottenness is the foundation for the breakdown
of truth and for Heidegger, are “basically the same.”320 However, as the Resonating is
sounded out, there must be an engagement with them separately to make sense of the
greatest plight and thereby, “resound for the first time the most remote nearness to the
absconding of the gods.”321 Heidegger’s position on the Forgottenness of beyng has
merit in its uniqueness, which includes his assertion of the need for its Questionworthiness. Yet for Heidegger, this overlooking of the question of beyng has much
deeper historical significance, such that the entire history of western philosophy is
shaped by this lack of questioning and its subsequent distortion of truth, a
Forgottenness that transforms into the Abandonment by beyng. This is what shapes
the historicality of beyng, the first beginning in its guiding question and his prophesied
was much more responsible for representational thinking and truth as correctness than Plato, a
consideration not made by Heidegger within the Contributions.
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other beginning through the basic question. As observed in the previous section, the
foundation for the first beginning’s distortion of the question of truth in Plato is
problematic, however, the Forgottenness of beyng concept remains a pertinent
historical occurrence.
It is Heidegger’s position that the guiding question “What are beings?” is asked in its
most general form by Aristotle and has inevitably guided the beginning of western
philosophy and its history up to its end in Nietzsche.322 This is questioning that
overlooked the basic question in the questioning of beyng – a leap into the truth of
beyng itself.323 As such, the entire history of western philosophy is an engagement with
Platonic philosophy moving within the same neo-Kantianism and not grasping the
question of beyng.324 Here two critical points need to be assessed and to begin with,
the lack of deeper questioning of beyng is relevant with one particular exception that
Heidegger only mentions in brief, “From the Greeks to Nietzsche, the guiding question
determines the same mode of asking about “being.” The clearest and greatest example
attesting to this unity of the tradition is Hegel’s Logic.”325 The first of the Contributions
shortcomings, therefore, is based on the lack of deeper engagement with Hegel’s The
Doctrine Of Being in his The Science of Logic and as such, a different historical
account of the Forgottenness of beyng.326 This represents a significant hiccup
historically en route to the other beginning and an alternative view of the first
beginning, which according to Hegel:

left unconsidered, a matter of indifference, and consequently
also the need to ask with what a beginning should be made
remains of no importance in face of the need for the principle
in which alone the interest of the fact seems to lie, the interest
as to what is the truth, the absolute ground of everything.327
Hegel’s starting point, like Heidegger’s, is that all western philosophy is grounded in
unquestioned propositions and as such, equally demonstrate a Forgottenness. The
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more unique approach of the Contributions, however, is based on the conception of
the questioning, and what the Forgottenness itself is a Forgottenness of. This may be
the reason for the lack of focus that Heidegger places on Hegel’s Doctrine of Being,
in that it remains constricted to the Platonic Being and its forebearer in the NeoKantian tradition. Hegel’s position is based on the perplexity of the beginning’s lack
of method and logic.328 Abstract thought for Hegel is limited to content, which drives
the culture of philosophy through a study of the cognitive process, subjectivity, form
and their foundation on principle.329 So, for Hegel “the principle ought to be also the
beginning, and that which has priority for thinking ought to be also the first in the
process of thinking.”330 This forms the basis for logic and its Forgottenness of logic
historically. Furthermore, Hegel will reject inner revelation, faith or intellectual
revelation in the face of logic, which also reinforces his unique determination of the
first beginning. Herein lies the divergence in the two respective thinker’s assessment
of the beginning; Hegel’s as based on the lack of rigours of logic and method which
is instead replaced by the abstractive philosophy of Being, whilst for Heidegger, the
overlooking of the basic question that constitutes the need for an entirely different
approach, a succumbing to the truth of beyng, which is an overcoming of the rigours
of logic and method etc.331

The purpose of the Contributions is to demonstrate the thinking of the other beginning
in the Event as a reinvention of thought, expression and potentially language. Hegel’s
position presents no such alternative and will remain constricted to the very framework
of thinking that the Contributions is attempting to overcome. Hegel’s other beginning
is to be logical in an “element of a free, self-contained thought” which inevitably is
the “absolute truth of consciousness.”332 Therefore, Hegel’s study of consciousness
and pure knowledge does not make the required break from the Platonic and the
Kantian tradition whilst also making presuppositions. For even in the sense of logic
which presupposes objective thinking, is an investigation of Being that in itself is
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presupposed as a consequence. So, Hegel’s position is most worthy of consideration
amidst the historical narrative as that which acknowledged the lack of questioning, a
Forgottenness and a need for another beginning, although, not providing an alternative
in his logic. This, nevertheless, shows another viewpoint of Heidegger’s inconsistent
history of the first beginning, in its neglect of Hegel’s relevance within the
Forgottenness. Heidegger places a greater emphasis on Aristotle, whom he credits as
the first and last to approach the question of Being, albeit insufficiently. This is
misleading, considering Hegel’s place in this historical tradition, as Hegel did progress
further than Aristotle, although along the same lines. This will lead to another
important historical occurrence that needs further investigation in Heidegger’s
assessment of the Forgottenness, a return to Plato once more.
Heidegger’s representation of the other beginning within the Contributions will
undoubtedly find no parallels in the history of western philosophy, yet its surfacing in
the Resonating due to the Platonic distortion is fallacious. If there are to be any
similarities or closeness in thought that Heidegger envisions within this other
beginning, it must be from the Platonic foundation. There are several ways that this
can be demonstrated more comprehensively of which would be the subject of another
thesis altogether, however, several points can be demonstrated concisely that the
Contributions fails to appropriate fully in its assessment of the first beginning and its
ostensible role in the Forgottenness of beyng:
1. Plato’s philosophy cannot be assessed entirely by his one
conception of the theory of Forms and especially, its
inception within the Cave allegory. Numerous dialogues
discuss the Forms such as Phaedrus, Parmenides (of
which Plato himself is doubtful of their instantiation) and
Timaeus to name a few.333
2. Plato’s metaphysics is subject to change in his large
expansive dialogues of which are worthy of further
engagement with, as, in the Seventh Letter where Plato
explains that the deepest truth and metaphysics cannot be
Plato, John M Cooper and D. S Hutchinson, Complete Works (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub.,
1997), 388. In Parmenides, Plato talks about ‘the instant’ – a description of some point in between an
object’s transition from one stage to the other. This instant is between motion and rest which also means
that it is not in any time at all. So all change happens from within this instant, a coming to be that is
analogous to Heidegger’s “juncture of truth” as the time-space of the moment of the Event. Heidegger,
Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 26.
333
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expressed in written form.334 This is again, comparable to
Heidegger’s beyng as unknowable or indescribable. The
Timaeus’ prophetic insight that was discussed in the
previous section is also worthy of consideration in its
closeness to Heidegger’s exegesis of thinking in the other
beginning.
3. Heidegger’s reading of Plato was also precarious, in that
the period between 1931-1934, the Cave allegory helped
in grasping the “essence of alêtheia as unhiddenness.”335
This will change at some point in the 1930s and by the
time Heidegger’s Plato’s Doctrine of Truth is published
in the 1940s, he makes a complete reversal in his view.336
4. Heidegger’s disastrous political endeavour may have
been influenced by his reading of Plato’s involvement
with the tyrant of Syracuse as dictated in the Seventh
Letter.337 This points to another potential discrepancy in
the Contributions’ reading of Plato, which may also be
the basis for the radical shift in his reading of Plato
towards the end of the 1930s.
5. As shown in the previous section, the distortion of truth
from unconcealment to correctness is fallacious, such that
truth itself as correctness is founded on unconcealment.
Plato’s philosophy, therefore, can be viewed as a
Parmenidean perpetuation, especially when considering
Plato’s Parmenides dialogue where the Forms are not left
unchallenged.
6. Heidegger fails to take into account the Neoplatonists and
their reading of Plato in his history of metaphysics. This
includes a very comprehensive and detailed exposition of
Platonic philosophy that encompassed a period of over
three hundred years. The Neoplatonist interpretation,
though too detailed to provide for here, nevertheless
represents a unique reading of Plato. It is important to
note, however, that Neoplatonism will have a substantial
influence on the Renaissance era and Christianity therein.
This will subsequently manifest in a renewal of theurgy,
alchemy and magic that was exemplary of key thinkers
such as Iamblichus and Proclus. Figures such as Giovanni
Pico Della Mirandola and Giordano Bruno of the
Renaissance were also very heavily influenced by this
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tradition, and as such, certainly showcases an alternative
reading of the history of philosophy and Plato.338
7. Heidegger does not take into account the influential
power of the Protestant Reformation’s relationship with
science, technology and its refutation of the philosophical
tradition that preceded it. Francis Bacon, for instance,
would praise the Pre-Socratics as materialists and utterly
reject Plato and Aristotle in an effort to disclose all there
is to be known about the world through science and
technology. The Protestant Reformation, therefore,
through its embracing of the Pre-Socratics and rejection
of Plato and Aristotle plays a very important role in
contributing to modern science and technology.339 In
other words, it can be said that Heidegger’s
Abandonment from the perspective of the Protestant
Reformation is more a result of the change of historical
emphasis from Plato and Aristotle toward the PreSocratics as opposed to the inverse in Heidegger's
account.
On a final note, Kant also plays a significant role in the first beginning’s history as
shown in chapter two. Kant’s philosophy is for Heidegger a completion of the Platonic
inception, in that it takes Platonism to its limits and subsequently results in the German
Idealist tradition and therefore, remains within the first beginning’s framework of
thinking. Hegel’s philosophy will subsequently demonstrate the catalysis of these
Kantian limitations. So, the Forgottenness will have two main historical junctures in
Plato and Hegel. Heidegger is rightful in demonstrating the Forgottenness as
congruent with the lack of questioning within the western philosophical tradition,
however, the inconsistencies are based on firstly, his idiosyncratic reading of Plato
and his overlooking of the majority of the Platonic corpus and secondly, the lack of

The other beginning on Heidegger’s account as that which represents an overcoming of calculative
thinking can be clearly observed in several Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus and Proclus. The
limitations of thinking for Proclus for instance, are to be overcome through divinational practices, and
their reliance on a unique expression that reflects the overcoming of calculative thinking.
339
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role in the foundation of the Forgottenness being more a consequence of a particular interpretation of
Plato and less his actual philosophy. As such, Heidegger’s reading of history is also limited by his own
unique interpretation of Plato, much like key figures of the Protestant Reformation, Neoplatonism and
the Renaissance. It is worth noting that Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus explained that intellectual
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Crystal Addey, Divination and Theurgy in Neoplatonism (New York, NY: Routledge Taylor & Francis
Group, 2014), 41.
338

101 | P a g e

affirmation of the Hegelian Doctrine of Being that also represents another significant
critical historical questioning of Being worthy of deeper excavation. As such, the
Forgottenness of beyng will need another historical reinterpretation to understand this
historical narrative more concisely, taking into consideration these two important
historical points. This is, however, intrinsic to the repetitive historical account of the
other beginning that the Contributions envision.

The Abandonment by Beyng

The second chapter has shown that the Abandonment finds its historical roots in the
thinking of Being as based on beingness, a demonstration of the guiding question that
was elucidated most clearly and exclusively by Aristotle. This, of course, would lead
to the Forgottenness and its continuance in the Abandonment of which its various
modes are unveiled. It is this thesis’ position that the Abandonment is Heidegger’s
stronger idea within the Contributions but because it is not exhibited succinctly, it
requires further elaboration through contemporary examples to further demonstrate its
importance.
Heidegger’s historical timeline is based on Aristotle as the first and last who posed the
question of Being which presumably means that the Abandonment first arises postAristotle’s philosophy. However, the more pronounced modes that begin with
machination only surfaces in Heidegger’s age, or presumably, around the time of the
industrial revolution. machination, as observed in the second chapter, remains
shrouded in lived experience and will often lead thinkers astray in recognising this
deeper cause, of which symbolises the greatest plight. This can be demonstrated in the
various historical approaches taken by thinkers before Heidegger’s time and beyond
in their shortcomings in identifying this condition. The monumental thinker Karl
Marx, who preceded Heidegger, devised a very articulate economic critique of
Capitalism and its effect on the human condition and society as a whole which proved
monumental. Terms such as alienation, commodification, relationships of commerce,
estranged labour and others showcase Marx’s particular critique as measures of the
detrimental effect of Capitalism that are not unlike Heidegger’s lived experience.
There is no need for expounding on the influential and historical significance of
Marxism because of this, however, it is important to show its constriction within the
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beingness of beings and more specifically, a materialistic dialectic foundation. Marx
and others fail to expose the historical foundation of the thinking that has guided the
history of western thought that resulted in the aforementioned issues. So, in the case
of Marxism, the critique has its roots in the Hegelian dialectic, albeit a physicalist
reversal. Therefore, the criticism remains within the very same thought process that it
is attempting to refute, a critique that is built on the beingness of beings to establish
an alternative that is also founded on the first beginning and the guiding question. This
is not an example that is exclusive to the Marxist condition, Heidegger’s
Abandonment by beyng can be demonstrated equally across all philosophical
frameworks of thinking contemporaneously, as they are all demonstrative of thinking
that have abandoned Being and as such, allow for the greatest plight’s persistence in
its hidden nature.

The thinking envisioned by the other beginning is yet to be sounded out through the
Resonating - a paradigmatic shift in thought that begins with the recognition of the
greatest plight and thereby, the Question-worthiness of beyng. The approaches
hitherto have all been within the same tradition that began with the first beginning.
Therefore, it is important to draw parallels between the varying modes of the
Abandonment and its relevance today. A related issue can be brought up in the subject
matter of the ecological crisis. Heidegger, through the concept of the machination,
asserts that this is an inevitable occurrence of the Abandonment, in that beings as such
are represented by their objectively driven interpretation. Humanity’s exploitation of
the Earth for resource extraction or waste disposal, for instance, is an exhibition of the
objective representative thinking of the first beginning – beings are to be viewed as
that which are characterised by their usefulness, calculation, giganticism, etc. This
lack of the opening to the mystery of beings is what showcases machination and its
hiddenness amidst the lived experience, and such opens the world of beings to
exploitation ecologically among others.

From here, human beings are characterised by lived experience. In discourse and
expression, the human being will point to ecology as an area of study, exploitable
resource potential or in a place for preservation due to its beauty, both approaches
being characterised by the same framework of thought. Language and expression will
then reflect this comportment towards beings, such that human beings cannot allow
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for a more originary uncovering of ecology. This will further perpetuate in the human
being’s lack of deeper meditative capacity and inner contemplation which allows the
denuding to compound upon itself and perpetuate further, which language will then
reflect in its ecological worldview. Here, beings are then enframed gigantically, such
that their quality is descriptive of their quantity, i.e., the greater the resource potential,
the greater the value. This will be reinforced by total mobilization, such that the human
being’s comportment towards beings that are descriptive of the denuding, gigantic,
lived experience and their root in machination will all be encapsulated
interdependently. Ecology will never be viewed more than that which is to be
preserved or exploited, all depending on the calculative potential of science and its
determination of it. In the current reign of science and technology where all areas of
study external to them are viewed as not lucrative for “progress” effectively repels
future students from engaging in alternative areas of study and as such, are Totally
Mobilized in their machination dictated existence.340
The final point to touch on regarding the Abandonment’s relevance would be in
nihilism. Recall that the nihilism of the Abandonment is not comparable to
Nietzsche’s, but a relation to the transformation of the human being due to the lack of
goal setting and their distraction by cultural assets. The Abandonment’s nihilism will
showcase itself in modernity as the human being’s drive for goals that are in
themselves a goal. This hides the true nature of what it is that is being striven for, such
that the machination and lived experience are never penetrated or exposed as they
remain hidden within the goallessness of the human being and their engagement with
the beingness of beings. Cultural assets will act as a distraction or facade, a
demonstration of the supposed exposure to the cultural or aesthetic, whilst, these are
still exhibited through total mobilization. In the context of modern cinema, the human
being’s entertainment may showcase an alternative, invigorate a movement for change
or enhance the appreciation for what is already existent. This, however, is all a form
of reinforcing complacency in its illusory exhibition of the potential for change. For
example, human beings will be comforted in their exposure to alternatives in a
camping trip, a visit to a national park, a humanitarian aid mission or the exposure to
340
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animals in captivity without really having the potential to uncover the foundational
cause and accentuate real change. These are all examples of the lived experience, all
determined by the machination’s allowance for human interaction through the
denuding. Change is never possible, overcoming is never in sight, alternatives are
always constricted to that which is to be refuted and most importantly, human beings
are completely ignorant of this. This can be demonstrated infinitely, but for efficiency
and to avoid being monotonous, this should suffice in the displaying the
Abandonment’s manifestation contemporaneously.
Perhaps the Abandonment’s most relevant feature is in the lack of engagement with
it, such that all the critiques of Being thus far, fail to enact real change. Ecological
destruction and climate change persist and have consistently with little in the way.
Numerous roadblocks have been constructed in the way of these crises, all of which
fail at the deeper questioning needed to apprehend the true cause of humanity’s
engagement with Being and beings. Therefore, the Abandonment is never more
relevant than today, where the crises that the greatest plight exhibits are at its latest
stage, and as such, is demonstrative of issues that are beyond a complete and
comprehensive analysis. This will lead to proposed solutions that are more and more
distant from the true cause, of which the denuding will perpetuate. The recognition of
the denuding is key in understanding this by way of a return to the historicality of the
Abandonment in the Forgottenness and the Question-worthiness of beyng that is
needed to enact real change.

The Question-worthiness of Beyng and the Other Beginning
It is not this thesis’s position to propose that the issues raised in the last chapter are
exclusive to machination. As mentioned earlier, total mobilization and the denuding
represent particular facets of lived experience and at this stage, the human being’s
comportment towards beings is manifesting in additional and more complex ways that
are yet to be understood. However, the need for their exposure through the source in
the Forgottenness remains obligatory. The recognition of the greatest plight that will
allow for the Resonating must come in effect and then, the Question-worthiness of
beyng can be envisioned in the other beginning. While this sounds somewhat mystical,
there are several strengths and weaknesses in Heidegger’s Contributions that are
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worthy of exploration. To begin with the relative shortcomings of the proposed
solution; the notion of the Future Ones needs to be addressed.

The Future Ones in the Contributions represents the shortest chapter and additionally,
provides a weaker exegesis in comparison to the other chapters. Working with what is
briefly covered in the text, the problems do not stop there. The notion of those who
cannot fall prey to the age of calculation, bear the staff of the truth of beyng and
practice a sacrificial restraint in the advent of the gods - risks demonstrating the
coming of a messianic figure. The obvious Nietzschean influence here can be seen to
be the driving force behind Heidegger’s writings coupled with an eschatological
narrative. This narrative can also give an elitist twist to the problem at hand, such that
this is not to be viewed as a humanity at large issue, rather only for those who can
withstand the task which inadvertently, establishes a human disparity. Building on
this, the only example Heidegger gives of the Future Ones is in Hölderlin as who is
“the most futural” in his poems, which again, is not based on anything apart from his
being a poet.341 It is not entirely clear as to what it is about Hölderlin’s poems that
separate him from the other poets, and Heidegger will not expound on this in sufficient
detail to support this in the Contributions. There is no indication that Hölderlin will
be steadfast in the mood of restraint and ground Da-sein either, and no further clarity
being provided on what it is about the poetic style that distinguishes him from others
in this potentiality. Be that as it may, the insinuations point to futural figures that
practice poetry, thinking, deed and sacrifice, which as described in the third chapter
are characteristics of restraint. Restraint is what is needed in the other beginning, a recreation of beings which again, gives no further indication as to how Hölderlin
341
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demonstrates this. The most that can be gained from Heidegger’s Future Ones is the
concept of thinkers of the future who begin anew apropos beings. This is historical, a
reinterpretation of the first beginning and its consequence for the transformation of
western thought and its influence.
This leads to the strength of Heidegger’s disposition in the Contributions, which lies
in the foundation of questioning and thinking. If these futural thinkers persist – the
Question-worthiness of beyng will become the dominant mode of thought. This
presents the more unique aspect of Heidegger's thinking and is also a path that has
several relevant points. The historical return for a more original repetition of the
history of western thought has its merits in allowing for an alternative approach in the
engagement with ideas that have shaped metaphysics and science thus far. Western
philosophy that is founded on the first beginning needs to be subjected to repeated
study (as this thesis has done in its critique of Heidegger’s history in the previous
section) to strive for the other beginning. This confrontation that the Contributions
envisages, will inevitably allow for an overcoming of the beingness of beings, through
beyng as the Event. Presumably, this is a prospect for a different foundation of the
sciences and metaphysics, an opening that may present a way of inhabiting the world
that overcomes the Abandonment. This foundation is ‘groundless’ in its essence, never
constructing a particular framework of thought, and therefore, immune from being
constrained within a worldview or system. This requires a paradigmatic shift in
thinking and as such, will shape the human being’s comportment towards beings
differently. So far, the Contributions displays a sound approach, relatively concise and
free from further vagueness. This is the Contributions’ strength, a clear affirmation of
the importance of history, a need for a more original repetition of it, and a challenge
to the dominance of objective-representational thinking that has characterised much
of the western philosophical tradition, metaphysics and science. However, the Future
One’s role in this is what seems incongruent with the entire project and
notwithstanding this, the Contributions showcase a very important and unique insight
into the history of western philosophy and consequently, overcoming the
Forgottenness’ continuance in the Abandonment.

By way of a final assessment of the other beginning and the Question-worthiness of
beyng; this thesis affirms the need for deeper questioning and as such, a surrendering
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to the mystery of beings. The historical component of this is crucial and as such, will
allow for another way of engaging with beings, thinking that is not guided – but
instead, focused on the basic question. The strength and validity of this are based on
its uniqueness, for it has never been attempted before due to, as this thesis shows - the
hidden nature of the plight. Having established the relevance of the Abandonment
earlier in the chapter, this formulation is even more prominent in the plight. As such,
by recognising a crisis based on the lack of questioning, the overcoming of the
Abandonment can occur as a result. It is this thesis’s position that this is a path hitherto
untraversed, which further adds to the difficulty in envisioning the inceptual thinking
of the other beginning. To be more concise, the Event is in-itself inceptual and as such
– its essential occurrence is the only indication of its coming to be. To conclude then,
this chapter has attempted to shed light on both the strength and weaknesses of the
Contributions. The Forgottenness is a sound foundation for the questioning that is
needed, although, in contrast to Heidegger’s assertion; it cannot be shown to have
originated solely in Plato, much less in his Cave allegory. Furthermore, to assert that
this lack of questioning was largely non-existent within the Pre-Socratics is
problematic given the primary material philosophers and historians have access to.
This chapter also focused on the significant historical ideas that Heidegger has
overlooked, particularly in Hegel who recognised the lack of foundation and similarly,
envisioned another beginning, albeit a different one - based on the rigours of logic.
This all has been shown to have little effect in addressing the problems of the
Abandonment contemporaneously. Moreover, as per Heidegger’s account, this
showcases some of the stronger ideas that he portrays in the text. Notwithstanding the
Nietzschean quasi-elitist-messianic figure’s influence, the Forgottenness’ overcoming
through the other beginning, as this thesis has shown, has never been more relevant as
a historical and philosophical project.
On the topic of Heidegger’s difficult writing within the Contributions, it is important
to note that this is an attempt to speak and think through the other beginning, inceptual
thinking through the truth of beyng. This provides for some semblance of the proposed
solution, which showcases the quasi-poetic and proposition-less verbiage within the
Contributions. As addressed in the first chapter on the Turn, the shift in the expression
on Heidegger’s part comes with his realisation that the impediments in the language
of metaphysics are rooted in the first beginning. To overcome this limitation in the
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Abandonment, the thinking and saying must go beyond the first beginning’s objective
representational framework. A complete rejection of the first beginning and its entire
philosophical tradition is not intended nor needed. Upon closer study, numerous terms
and concepts from thinkers of the past are appropriated within the Contributions, i.e.,
Kierkegaard’s Leap, Ernst Junger’s total mobilization, Nietzsche’s God, Heraclitus’s
Strife etc. This is an exhibition of the other beginning concomitantly with the first
beginning - reimagine language and thinking beyond a mere dialectical process. As
such, the Ancient Greek tradition onwards are reinvigorated anew, and are then
propelled onto an ‘other beginning’. This process is to be subjected to repeated study
and thought, such that Heidegger cannot represent the last word. This whole project is
historical, and therefore, signifies what it means to engage with the Forgottenness of
beyng and overcome the Abandonment by beyng through the Question-worthiness of
beyng.

CONCLUSION
The Contributions prove useful for understanding the Turn (die Kehre) in Heidegger’s
thought after Being and Time. This thesis has demonstrated the complete reversal (as
Heidegger himself deemed it) from the systematic approach of Being and Time to
“thinking the Event” of the Contributions. The predominant feature of the text that
Heidegger will consistently and perpetually refer to throughout his later works is this
Event (Ereignis) - with a substantial critique of the Contributions in a later work
published as The Event (Das Ereignis).342 This is but one of a series of six articulations
post the Contributions that are all centred on the Event that was conceptualised post
the Turn. As such, the term proves to be of critical importance in understanding
Heidegger’s later thought in light of the Contributions. This is a project that must be
envisioned through the other beginning, the paradigmatic shift in thinking and
philosophy. The Event, however, is still in need of inauguration by the Future Ones of
the Last God. By all accounts then, the Abandonment persists in the modern age,
cloaking its necessary precondition – the Forgottenness of beyng. Taking this into
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account, the Contributions can be interpreted eschatologically in a sense, not unlike
Hegel’s end of history, albeit envisioning a different purpose and outcome.

This thesis hitherto has shown that the Contributions demonstrates a monumental
outlook of the contemporary age. The challenges that human beings face in the form
of the machination, lived experience and others are not to be seen as strictly negative
and a roadblock, instead, they are intrinsic to their own overcoming. Stated simply,
the other beginning can only occur as the first beginning begins to succumb to its
destructiveness. The point here is this; the challenges that humanity faces are an
invitation for a different approach through the opening of a space. This space
represents the focal point of the thesis – Being must become historical; “beyng
historical thinking.” There needs to be a comprehensive return to the foundation of
philosophy and thinking to create a space for a multitude of ways of being in the world.
In so doing, that space must remain open to questioning to overcome the
destructiveness of cementing a particular worldview and hindering further
development.

This outlook shows the importance of understanding the historical becoming of Being
qua beings. The Forgottenness has shaped the world in the way that is currently
manifesting in the challenges posed whilst also calling for a return to beyng’s
“unforgetting.” Importantly, Heidegger’s concerns within the Contributions are also
to be open to questioning which this thesis has attempted to achieve. This thesis,
therefore, is an invitation to make all thinking and Being question worthy in its
historicality. This is exhibited by recognising the foundation of the Forgottenness and
simultaneously reinforcing a repeated re-appropriation of human history. So, this is
the essential ‘plan’; in the Contributions exhibiting the portrayal of the other beginning
via a perceived recognition of the Forgottenness.

The difficulty in imagining the other beginning and the essential occurrence of the
Event lies in understanding a system-less approach that is devoid of an event as such.
The eight ways that were laid out in the fifth chapter is the closest intimation of what
is involved. However, this is perhaps where the most important message of the
Contributions resides; the need for a change in thinking synonymously with Being.
This is also why Heidegger was engrossed by the Pre-Socratics, even though it led to
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idiosyncratic interpretations of them, the motivation behind his study of them is what
is important. Thinking and Being are to be unitary, there is no distinct separation, a
rejection of the subject and object dichotomy that has characterised much of the history
of western philosophy. An overcoming of this process of thinking can also be
attributed to the other beginning, although, this is minor in comparison to what would
be involved in its entirety. This does, however, demonstrate some of the key concepts
of the text, such as in the historical repetition that is needed in overcoming the
inception of the subject and object dichotomy, a historical reference point for that
which is to anchor the first beginning for the repetitive re-engagement with the other
beginning.

The historical ideas that have shaped the history of western philosophy have also
shown to be following a certain trajectory, although Heidegger’s characterisation of
this is not without its faults. It does, regardless, demonstrate a very useful
interpretation of the historical process, which again, is not something set in stone. So,
although Heidegger’s interpretation may suffer a few inconsistencies, his main
assertion stands; a historical repetition is subject to an ebb and flow of ideas and their
incorporative capacity with the future of philosophy and the other beginning. This
abyssal ground that is symptomatic of the other beginning is useful for not cementing
a framework of thought into a particular worldview, which in itself, is contrary to
philosophy’s nature. Philosophy as inceptual thinking must be groundless in its ground
to provide for thinking that is consistently free to make the aforementioned historical
repetition - a very unique approach when compared to thinkers of the past. This quasianarchism of thought is what is needed to consistently make ground in philosophy,
thinking and Being. Needless to say, the Contributions does not serve as a manual or
guiding force for this process, as that would in itself contradict the very project being
envisioned. This is also why the language within the text has proved difficult to
decipher, along with the lack of structure among other factors. This thesis has
attempted to show that the system-less approach provides true potentiality for change,
as the Abandonment is in fact, real and concretely observable within the current era
humanity finds itself in. By allowing for this flux-like status of thinking and the
historically repetitive engagement with the first beginning, a new approach to the crisis
of the Abandonment can be actualised. The other beginning that Heidegger imagines
is yet to be imagined, as evidence by metaphysics and science being unable to discuss
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the not and art in their limitations. This is to point to what would be needed in the
thinking outside of these inherent limitations that are bound to the first beginning. It
is important to note that the other beginning and the essential occurrence of the Event
are not some mystical abstractions that reside within the thought of a particular thinker,
but are already present within the thought of the Pre-Socratics, Plato and onwards. The
history of philosophy does represent the opening in this sense, which shows that there
is genuine practical potential behind the concept. Given the influence of the
Abandonment, however, the Forgottenness of beyng must be recognised in its hidden
nature. This can only be achieved through the Question-worthiness of beyng as a
response to the Resonating of beyng.
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